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Abstract 
In this thesis, I evaluate the effects of the minimum capital requirement on firm dynamics in Fin-
land. Specifically, I look at the number, survival and employment growth of entrant firms. I also 
explore the dynamics of incumbent firms and overall employment. I find evidence that lowering the 
minimum capital requirement causes an increase in the number of limited companies created and 
a net increase in the number of jobs created by young limited companies. The effect is potentially 
very large, though significant uncertainty remains over the magnitude. As for the effects on incum-
bents and total employment, the evidence is inconclusive. 
The minimum capital requirement is a regulation that obliges the founder(s) of a limited company 
to invest at least a certain amount towards the share capital of their firm. As such, it serves as a 
potential barrier for new entrepreneurs, especially considering the fact that most limited companies 
are founded using the minimum required amount of capital. Recent research has noted a declining 
trend in entry rates and the economic contribution of young firms across the developed world, and 
this thesis also provides descriptive evidence that suggests Finland is experiencing similar trends. 
Policy makers may look to the lowering of entry barriers as a response to such trends. Perhaps as an 
example of this, the minimum capital requirement has indeed been recently removed entirely in 
Finland, with an explicit goal of easing the setting up of businesses. With this in mind, I look at the 
effects of two previous reforms in the minimum capital requirement. 
Between its introduction in 1980 and removal in 2019, the minimum capital requirement went 
through two major alterations: first an increase from 15 000 Finnish markkas to 50 000 Finnish 
markkas in 1997 and then a decrease from 8 000 euros to 2 500 euros in 2006 (after a conversion 
from 50 000 mk to 8 000 €). Comparing industries that I expect to have been more affected by the 
reforms to those industries for which I expect the effects to be relatively small, I estimate that the 
latter reform led to the creation of roughly a thousand new limited companies per year in 2007-2017 
with little drop in average performance, but find no evidence for any effects of the former reform. 
There might be several reasons for the conflicting results, for instance data limitations in case of the 
1997 reform and potential confounding factors inflating the estimates of the 2006 reform. However, 
some of the descriptive evidence shows patterns that are strongly suggestive of the existence of an 
effect in both cases. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that lowering entry barriers, at least the minimum capital require-
ment, is a potential tool for increasing employment, though there might be other negative effects - 
for instance on productivity or the protection of consumers and debtors - that are not explored here. 
Furthermore, it alone is unlikely to turn around the trend of falling entry rates and economic con-
tribution of entrants. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tässä tutkielmassa arvioin vähimmäispääomavaatimuksen vaikutuksia suomalaiseen yritysdyna-
miikkaan. Tarkastelen uusien yritysten perustamismääriä sekä perustettujen yritysten selviytymis-
tä ja työllisyyskasvua eri vähimmäisvaatimusten aikana. Lisäksi selvitän markkinoilla jo olevien 
yritysten dynamiikkaa sekä kokonaistyöllisyyttä. Tulosteni mukaan vähimmäisvaatimuksen alen-
taminen nostaa perustettujen yritysten määrää huomattavasti vähentämättä merkittävästi niiden 
suorituskykyä selviytymisen ja työllisyyskasvun valossa. Vaikutus on mahdollisesti hyvinkin suuri, 
joskin sen arviointiin liittyy paljon epävarmuutta. Markkinoilla jo olevien yritysten sekä kokonais-
työllisyyden osalta näyttö vaikutuksista on epäselvää. 
Vähimmäispääomavaatimus on säännös, jonka mukaan osakeyhtiön osakepääomaan on sijoitet-
tava vähintään tietty summa yritystä perustettaessa. Näin ollen, se toimii mahdollisena esteenä 
uusille yrittäjille, erityisesti ottaen huomioon, että suurin osa osakeyhtiöistä on perustettu vähim-
mäispääomalla. Viimeaikainen tutkimus on huomioinut monissa kehittyneissä valtioissa laskevan 
trendin uusien yritysten osuudessa taloudellisesta toiminnasta, ja tässä tutkielmassa esitetyn näy-
tön perusteella trendi koskee myös Suomea. Vastauksena poliittiset päätöksentekijät saattavat 
koettaa madaltaa markkinoille tulon esteitä. Mahdollisesti esimerkkinä tästä vähimmäispääoma-
vaatimus poistettiinkin Suomessa hiljattain kokonaan, ja poistamista perusteltiin yritysten perus-
tamisen helpottamisella. Tätä kehitystä vasten tarkastelen tässä tutkielmassa kahta vähimmäis-
pääomavaatimuksessa aiemmin tapahtunutta uudistusta. 
Ennen kuin 1980 luvulla voimaan astunut vaatimus poistettiin heinäkuussa 2019, sitä ehdittiin 
muuttaa merkittävästi kaksi kertaa: vuonna 1997 kun se nostettiin 15 000 markasta 50 000 mark-
kaan ja vuonna 2006 kun se laskettiin 8 000 eurosta 2 500 euroon (Suomen siirtyessä euroon vaa-
timus muuttui 50 000 markasta lähes samaa summaa vastaavaan 8 000 euroon). Vertaamalla 
toimialoja, joille oletan vähimmäispääomavaatimuksen olevan merkittävämpi este toimialoihin, 
joille puolestaan oletan sen olevan verrattain matala este, arvioin jälkimmäisen uudistuksen joh-
taneen vuosittain noin tuhannen uuden osakeyhtiön syntyyn vuosina 2007-2017. Vuoden 1997 
uudistukselle en puolestaan löydä näyttöä minkäänlaisista vaikutuksista. Ristiriitaisille tuloksille 
on useita mahdollisia selityksiä, kuten vajaa tilastoaineisto ennen vuotta 1997 ja vuoden 2006 tu-
loksiin mahdollisesti vaikuttavat vääristävät tekijät. Osa esitetystä kuvailevasta aineistosta viittaa 
kuitenkin vahvasti siihen, että vaikutus on molemmissa tapauksissa olemassa.  
Kaiken kaikkiaan tulosten valossa vaikuttaa siltä, että esteiden alentaminen – ainakin vähim-
mäispääomavaatimuksen tapauksessa – on mahdollinen työkalu työllisyyden kasvattamiseen, jos-
kin tällä saattaa olla tämän tutkielman ulkopuolelle jääviä muita negatiivisia vaikutuksia esimer-
kiksi tuottavuuteen tai kuluttajien ja velkojien suojaan. On toisaalta myös epätodennäköistä, että 
tällaiset toimet yksinään kääntävät uusien yritysten laskevia trendejä. 
Avainsanat  yritysdynamiikka, markkinoille tulon esteet, vähimmäispääomavaatimus, yrittäjyys 
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1 Introduction
This thesis presents evidence on eﬀects of the minimum capital requirement (MCR for short) on ﬁrm
dynamics - the entry, growth and exit of ﬁrms - by making use of two reforms of the regulation during
its history in Finland: a decrease in 1997 and an increase in 2006. The MCR is a speciﬁc kind of entry
barrier which requires a certain amount of initial investment upon the founding of a company. In the
Finnish context this has speciﬁcally meant investment into the share capital of a limited company. The
evidence presented here broadly suggests that the MCR has been a meaningful barrier in the sense that
lowering it increases limited incorporation. The overall impact of the regulation, though, is inconclusive,
and it is not clear that the results can be extrapolated to other kinds of entry barriers.
Entrepreneurship is traditionally seen as an important part of a healthy economy, with young ﬁrms
often hailed as major sources of job creation and innovation via Schumpeterian creative destruction. In
this view, it is alarming that recent research on ﬁrm dynamics has found a trend of falling entry rates
and job creation by young ﬁrms around the developed world. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
(2014) observe a fall in the U.S. entry rate starting in the late 1980s, and ﬁnd that it is not being oﬀset
by an increase in the size of the entrants. An OECD study shows that similar trends are also present at
least for many European countries, Brazil, Canada and New Zealand (Calvino, Criscuolo, and Menon,
2015). Descriptive evidence presented in this paper suggests that Finland also shares these trends.
To spur entry in response to the falling trends, governments may try to bring down the barriers of
setting up a business. One such barrier that has existed in Finland and multiple other countries is the
MCR. First introduced in Finland in 1980, a recent development has indeed seen it removed entirely,
starting July 1st 2019, with a stated purpose of making it easier to set up small businesses (Parliament Of
Finland, 2018). In between, its level has been signiﬁcantly altered in two reforms: in 1997 the requirement
was raised from 25 000 to 50 000 Finnish markkas (corresponding approximately to a change from 2 500
to 8 400 euros according to the Parliament Of Finland (2018)) and in 2006 it was lowered from 8 000
euros to 2 500 euros. In this thesis, I make use of these two reforms and a long panel of Finnish ﬁrms
stretching from 1988 to 2017 to evaluate the eﬀects of the MCR on Finnish ﬁrm dynamics. Speciﬁcally,
I look at the number of entrants and their post-entry performance in terms of survival and employment
growth, as well as the performance of ﬁrms already in the market when a reform happens, and overall
employment by both entrants and incumbents.
Using a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences design with heterogeneous treatment intensity across industries sim-
ilar to previous empirical research on entrepreneurial activity by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) and
Hombert, Schoar, Sraer, and Thesmar (2017), I ﬁnd mixed evidence for the eﬀects of the MCR. Following
Hombert et al. (2017), I group industries based on a measure of treatment intensity - in this case the
share of entrants with minimum capital - and compare the changes in several outcomes from before to
after the reforms between the groups. The main estimates for the 2006 reform imply around a 1 000 new
limited companies per year attributable to the reform, which is a signiﬁcant number considering that in
2005 there were roughly 100 000 limited companies operating in Finland. However, there is likely bias in
these estimates in both directions making the true magnitude of the eﬀect highly uncertain.
When it comes to the performance of entrants, I ﬁnd a slight decrease in survival but no systematic
eﬀect on growth. Meanwhile, for the eﬀects on incumbents and total employment, it seems unlikely that
the identifying assumption holds. Hence, while there appears to be a positive eﬀect when it comes to
the contribution of entrants, making deﬁnitive claims about the overall eﬀects of the reform remains an
elusive goal.
A question mark is also raised by the estimates for the 1997 reform, which one would expect to go
systematically to the opposite direction from the 2006 case if the MCR was indeed the cause. However, this
does not happen for any outcome, and the estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level for nearly all of them. Due to data limitations, the treatment intensity measure used for the 1997
reform is less accurate than the one used for the 2006 reform, which might explain the failure to detect
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eﬀects, though it might also be that there is nothing to detect, which may or may not be a problem
for the 2006 results depending on whether the lack of eﬀect is due to the speciﬁcs of the 1997 economic
environment or something more general. The latter concern, though, is alleviated by the fact that some
of the descriptive evidence presented in section 2.5 strongly suggests that an eﬀect exists in both cases,
even if it's hard to convincingly say what the magnitude of the eﬀect is. The same evidence unfortunately
also suggests that the lowering of MCR-type entry barriers is an insuﬃcient response to the falling trends
of entry, insofar as one sees them as a problem in need of addressing.
This thesis proceeds in the following order: the next section establishes an empirical context, reﬂecting
Finland's situation to trends in ﬁrm dynamics across the developed world and presenting previous research
on the eﬀects of entry barriers as well as some robust facts that are important to keep in mind in any
discussion on ﬁrm dynamics. Section 3 reviews theoretical results on entrepreneurship and ﬁrm dynamics,
drawing implications that both give predictions on what one would expect to observe in the data, and
aﬀect the way the ﬁndings should be interpreted. Section 4 explains in detail the strategy to identify the
eﬀects of the MCR on the outcomes of interest and presents the results of the estimation, evaluating them
in the light of the theory discussed in section 3. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications, caveats and
further questions arising from the results, and section 6 provides a concluding summary.
3
2 Empirical Context
This thesis adds mainly to two strands of literature: empirical research on entry barriers and descriptive
research on ﬁrm dynamics. Previous empirical research on entry barriers has largely focused on static
analysis of their eﬀects on various indicators. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002)
describe the procedures required to set up a standardized1 ﬁrm in 85 countries all over the world and
use the data to evaluate theories of regulation. Especially they compare the public interest view, which
posits that a government pursuing social eﬃciency counters market failures through regulation, against
the public choice view, which sees the government as rent-seeking and hence regulation as ineﬃcient.
They ﬁnd that stricter regulation of entry is not associated with higher quality products, better pollution
records, better health outcomes or more competition, but is associated with higher levels of corruption
and larger relative informal sector, and hence conclude that the evidence supports the public choice view.
However, van Stel, Storey, and Thurik (2007) ﬁnd a lack of direct evidence for the eﬀect of entry
regulations on entrepreneurship and point out that given the explicit link made by Djankov et al.
between the speed and ease with which businesses may be established in a country and its economic
performance - and the enthusiasm with which this link has been grasped by European Union policy makers
- our ﬁndings imply that this link needs reconsidering. Examining the eﬀect of four entry regulation
variables - procedures, time, cost and minimum capital requirements - separately on the rates of nascent
entrepreneurs (i.e. people actively taking steps to set up a business) and owners of young businesses
for an unbalanced panel of 39 countries, they ﬁnd that only the MCR has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect.
Speciﬁcally they identify the MCR as lowering the rate of nascent entrepreneurs and hence indirectly,
though crucially not directly, the rate of owners of young businesses. This suggests that a higher minimum
capital requirement turns potential business founders oﬀ from pursuing entrepreneurship altogether but
does not act as an insurmountable obstacle for those already committed to the process of founding a
business. Of course, it does not mean that the barrier is merely psychological, as the ﬁnding is readily
explained by materially constrained people recognizing their situation before ever starting the process.
Klapper et al. (2006) make use of variation in the natural propensity for entry (proxied by entry
rates in the United States) between industries to ask if the industries with higher natural entry propensity
have lower entry rates in countries with higher entry costs. Further, they examine the eﬀect of the entry
regulations on the productivity growth of older incumbent ﬁrms, arguing that on the one hand indiscrim-
inately screening out young ﬁrms may lessen the threat of Schumpeterian creative destruction faced by
the incumbents and make them lazy, but on the other hand, if the regulations are an eﬀective screening
mechanism, the incumbent ﬁrms that have themselves passed through should be more competent. They
ﬁnd that countries with higher entry costs exhibit lower entry rates and lower productivity growth by
incumbents in industries most aﬀected by entry regulation (those that have low natural barriers to entry).
They also ﬁnd that high entry costs make entrants larger, suggesting that small ﬁrms are disincentivized
from entering, or have to grow to a certain point without the protection of limited liability (in a state
where they remain undetected in their data).
The evidence for the eﬀects of entry regulation on entrepreneurship, then, is inconclusive. While
Djankov et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence that high costs are associated with weaker economic performance of
a country in broad terms, van Stel et al. (2007) and Klapper et al. (2006) disagree on whether entry
regulations actually aﬀect entrepreneurship rates, though even the former notes that the MCR does seem
to have a negative eﬀect on the entry rate.
Notably, the aforementioned research has focused on cross-country comparisons and has thus not
been able to follow the post-entry performance of ﬁrms on a micro level. Hombert et al. (2017) on the
1A standardized ﬁrm in Djankov et al. (2002) is a ﬁrm that performs general industrial or commercial activities, operates
in the largest city of the country, is exempt from industry speciﬁc requirements, does not participate in foreign trade, does
not trade in goods that are subject to excise taxes, is a domestically owned limited liability company, has the higher of (a)
10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (b) the minimum capital requirement of capital subscribed in cash, does not own but
rents land and business premises, has between 5 and 50 employees one month after the commencement of operations all of
whom are nationals, has turnover of up to 10 times its start-up capital and does not qualify for investment incentives.
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other hand consider the eﬀect of a reform in entrepreneurs' unemployment insurance in France, taking
into account not only the entry rate but also dynamic eﬀects. They ﬁnd that an improvement in the
insurance - the lack of which can be viewed as an entry barrier even if it's not a direct cost - increases the
number of entrants and overall job creation by entrants, but decreases job creation by small incumbent
ﬁrms, though not large ones. Meanwhile, the reform does not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on the
quality of the entrants measured as the probability of hiring an employee or the probability of exiting
in the ﬁrst two years. The methodology of Hombert et. al. serves as an inspiration for the identifying
strategy in this thesis, and will be described in more detail in section 4.1.
In sum, while several studies have considered the eﬀects of entry barriers on the aggregate economic
performance of a country, or the entry rate, the empirical evidence for their dynamic eﬀects on the ﬁrm
level is still lacking. The contribution of this thesis then is especially to add to the latter, while speciﬁcally
studying the MCR, a barrier highlighted by van Stel et al. (2007) as having signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on
the rate of nascent entrepreneurship and by extension, if not directly, the entry rate. While evaluating
the dynamic eﬀects of the MCR is the main focus, an additional contribution is to explore the trends in
Finnish business dynamism from the early nineties almost to the present day and set them to international
context. The rest of this section presents recent descriptive research on ﬁrm dynamics - as well as some
well established stylized facts - comparing the trends around the world to those calculated for Finland
from the data used in this thesis. Before proceeding to that, though, a primer on the methodology of
measuring ﬁrm dynamics as well as a description of the data used and the institutional background are
in order.
2.1 The Data
The core of the data used comes from the business register database of Statistics Finland. For the years
1988 to 2012, the business register includes yearly observations for Finnish business entities that are
either employers or liable for the value added tax (or both). To be recorded in the data, a business has
to have operated for at least six months in the statistical year in question, and employed more than a
half employees (in full time equivalent units) or exceeded the minimum turnover limit. The minimum
turnover is set separately for each year and has grown monotonically from 8126 euros in 1995 to 10595
euros in 2012. The period includes a few major changes in the data gathering process. First is the move
from the turnover tax system to the value added tax system in 1994, which causes a break in the series of
legal entry and exit years. Next, in 1999, a business identiﬁer has been given to natural persons, replacing
their personal ID as the primary identiﬁer in the statistics. This causes a major spike of exits before
and entries after 1999, a problem that is mostly remedied by retrieving the old identiﬁers from the 1999
cross section (though a slight spike remains). Finally, and most importantly from the perspective of this
thesis, in 2006 the coverage of primary production and real estate businesses has been extended (Statistics
Finland, 2012), leading to a signiﬁcant increase to the number of businesses with their ﬁrst observation
in the year immediately following the second minimum capital reform. To mitigate the possible problems
this causes for the entry rate, these industries are excluded for the entire study period.
2013 sees a change in Statistics Finland's information systems and data gathering process to the extent
that the statistics are warned to not be comparable to the previous years. However, as the major source
of the turnover and employee ﬁgures is the same (i.e. the tax administration), the available years 2013
to 2017 are included with this caveat in mind (as a robustness check, all estimations are performed also
without these years, which does not substantially change the results - see appendix A.3). A major change
in the recording of the statistics is that in addition to the employee and turnover limits, a balance sheet
limit has been added in 2013 (Statistics Finland, 2017). Hence it is possible for a ﬁrm to be included in
the data even if it employs less than a half employees and stays below the turnover limit, as long as its
balance sheet exceeds 170 000 euros. To make the entry rates more comparable, all ﬁrms that do not
fulﬁll either the employee or the turnover requirements are excluded.
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With the above modiﬁcations, the core data becomes an unbalanced panel of 792 227 companies and
6 319 325 observations. In addition to the readily compiled Statistics Finland data, which provides the
ﬁgures for employment and turnover, as well as the numbers of businesses, their legal entry and exit
dates and classiﬁcations for legal forms and industries, ﬁnancial statement data directly from the tax
administration2 is used to obtain information on the share capital of the ﬁrms. The share capital data
is available for 2002-2016, a period that notably includes only the second of the reforms under study,
leading to the need to take an indirect approach when considering the 1997 reform. It covers 93.6% of
the limited companies entering between 2002 and 2016 - in total 117 854 ﬁrms. However, for 19 784 of
these ﬁrms, the observation for share capital in the entry year is missing. Since most ﬁrms (around two
thirds in the data) never change their share capital, I use the next available observation for those missing
the ﬁrst share capital.
2.2 Institutional Background
The institutional changes that are considered are two reforms of the law on limited companies, both
of which included an alteration in the level of the minimum capital requirement. To help the reader
understand the meaning of those alterations, this section provides a brief introduction to the legal forms
under which one can operate in Finland and the larger context of the reforms.
Legal forms of business entities in Finland
The Statistics Finland classiﬁcation identiﬁes 22 separate categories of legal forms for business entities in
Finland (Statistics Finland, 2012). Based on the classiﬁcation used by the tax administration, Statistics
Finland's classiﬁcation combines some rare legal forms under the same category. However, most of these
legal forms are relatively few in numbers and do not represent what one usually considers a competitive
ﬁrm. Hence, in this thesis attention is restricted to the four most common forms which are identiﬁed
separately in the Statistics Finland data, and account for 98.4% of the observations in the core data. By
far the most popular of these are natural persons (toiminimi, tmi) and limited companies (osakeyhtiö,
oy). Less popular, but still signiﬁcant, are general partnerships (avoin yhtiö, ay), and limited partnerships
(kommandiittiyhtiö, ky).3 Figure 1 plots the relative shares of these legal forms over the study period.
Notably, limited companies have gained popularity over both types of partnerships with the share of
natural persons staying quite ﬁxed.
The main diﬀerences between the four largest legal forms relate to the number of owners, the liability
and representability of the owners and the costs of setting up as well as running a business under a given
form. Natural persons are individual entrepreneurs who are personally liable for both the agreements
the business enters into and the debts of the business. Natural persons have no capital requirements and
do not necessarily have to register in the Trade Register, unless they operate in a licensed trade, have
permanent premises or employ people outside their immediate family. If they do decide to register, they
have to pay a handling fee of 110 euros. They register by ﬁlling out a notiﬁcation form (Y3), and do
not need additional documents apart from the receipt showing that they've paid the handling fee. The
natural person is their own representative.
General partnerships meanwhile must have at least two owners, called partners. The partnership
can enter into agreements as a separate legal entity, but the partners remain personally liable for the
partnership's debts. General partnerships still have no capital requirements, but they must register into
the trade register, paying a handling fee of 240 euros. Their bureaucratic cost is also slightly increased
by having to include the original Partnership Agreement as an enclosure to the notiﬁcation form (Y2).
2The tax administration data has been accessed via the VATT Institute for Economic Research
3The names and abbreviations inside the brackets correspond to the Finnish legal terms. The English translations are
given as used in the Statistics Finland data. However, there might be some diﬀerences in the interpretation of the English
terms across countries. Furthermore, natural persons might also be called sole proprietorships and general partnerships
just partnerships.
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The partnership is represented by the partners. Limited partnerships are otherwise the same as general
partnerships, except that they can have silent partners who are not personally liable for the partnership's
debts. The silent partners have to invest capital into the ﬁrm, but there is no minimum requirement
for the amount. A limited partnerships must have at least one general and one silent partner. Only the
general partners are representatives of the partnership.
Limited companies must have at least one shareholder. The shareholders are not personally liable
for the obligations of the company, and the company is represented by the board of directors. Upon
registration, the owners of a limited company must pay a fee of 380 euros, and include the original
Memorandum of Association and a copy of the Articles of Association as enclosures to the notiﬁcation
form (Y1 and appendix form 1). (Finnish Patent and Registration Oﬃce, 2018)
Figure 1
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Limited companies used to have a requirement for a minimum amount of capital to be invested
in the company, which is the next topic of discussion. There are, however, a few more diﬀerences
between the legal forms that should be pointed out. Firstly, natural persons are exempted from having
to apply double-entry bookkeeping, unless they ﬁll at least two of the following three conditions: over
100 000 euros of total assets, over 200 000 euros of turnover or comparable income and average personnel
amounting to more than three (Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs and Employment, 2017). This somewhat
lowers the bureaucratic cost associated with setting up a business under the natural person form. Another
signiﬁcant diﬀerentiator of the legal forms is their treatment in taxation. Speciﬁcally, limited companies
are independently liable for income taxation, while the other legal forms are not (Tax Administration,
2016). This means that, in practice, the shareholders of a limited company are taxed twice for the money
the company pays out to them: ﬁrst the proﬁts of the corporation are taxed, then the dividend incomes
of the shareholders. Finally, it should be mentioned that the classiﬁcation of limited companies includes
as a subset public limited companies (julkinen osakeyhtiö, oyj), which are limited companies that can
(though do not necessarily have to) be traded publicly, and are subject to more regulation than their
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private counterparts. Typically though, ﬁrms only go public after having already existed and grown
signiﬁcantly as private companies, so the distinction will be ignored here as the focus is on the incentives
for setting up an entirely new company.
The minimum capital requirement
While the cost of setting up a business as a natural person or a general or limited partnership consists
of small registration fees and the time invested to complete the bureaucratic process, limited companies
have traditionally also been required to invest a certain minimum amount towards the share capital
(osakepääoma) of the ﬁrm.4 Share capital belongs to the ﬁrm's restricted equity capital (sidottu oma
pääoma) and can be distributed to the shareholders only via a speciﬁc process called reduction of the
share capital. However, under an MCR regime, the ﬁrm must always have the speciﬁed minimum amount
of share capital, so that the only way to distribute the minimum share capital is via the dissolution and
deregistration of the company. (Ministry of Justice, 2012).
Note that share capital is simply an item belonging to the ﬁrm's equity (i.e. on the liabilities-side) on
the balance sheet. It is usually invested as cash, but it does not have to remain so. Hence, the ﬁrm can
use the cash generated by the share capital investments as it sees ﬁt, so long as it always has (at least
the minimum amount of) share capital, i.e. its assets minus non-equity liabilities must cover at least the
share capital (which has to be at least the speciﬁed minimum amount).
The MCR was introduced in Finland in 1980 and set to 15 000 Finnish markkas (corresponding
approximately to 2 500 euros). When the law was reformed in 1997, the requirement was adjusted for
inﬂation, leading to a new minimum of 50 000 Finnish markkas (approximately 8 400 euros). Then, as
Finland was moving from the Finnish markka to the euro, the minimum was converted from 50 000 mk
to 8000 ¿ in 1999, and with the new law on limited companies of 2006, lowered to 2 500 ¿ (Parliament
Of Finland, 2018). Most recently, starting July 1st 2019, the MCR has been entirely removed (Muilu,
2019).
Hence there have been ﬁve changes in the MCR regime in Finnish history: once introduced, twice
reformed, once converted from one currency to another and once removed. The data described in the
previous section covers three of these changes: the raise from 15 000 mk to 50 000 mk in 1997 and the fall
from 8 000 ¿ to 2 500 ¿ in 2006, as well as the conversion from 50 000 mk to 8 000 ¿ in 1999. Though
the last mentioned may have introduced a slight change in the MCR in real terms, it will be ignored in
what follows for the relatively tiny nature of that change. The 1997 and 2006 reforms on the other hand
are quite signiﬁcant, and provide an excellent opportunity to evaluate eﬀects of changes in entry barriers
of a very concrete nature. Evaluating the eﬀects these reforms had on the Finnish economy also provide
valuable insights from the perspective of the latest change - the 2019 removal of the MCR - though much
data for it is not yet available.
Before proceeding, though, it must be noted that whatever eﬀects are estimated are potentially
inescapably confounded by other factors included in the reforms that introduced the changes in the
MCR. The 1997 change was a part of a larger reform of the law on limited companies, while the 2006
change belonged to a complete overhaul of the law on limited companies, with a new law replacing the
old one. Detailing every single change that these reforms included is far beyond the scope of this text,
but the government proposals given at the time provide a reasonable idea of the main objectives.
The proposal that led to the 1997 reform (Finlex, 1996) was said to include necessary changes to
execute directives of the European Communities as well as several changes stemming from national
interest. It introduced as new terms the division into public and private limited companies (oyj and
oy) and proposed extensions to the oﬃcially recognized set of ﬁnancial instruments available to limited
companies, namely option privileges, preferred shares and capital loans (note that the fact that these
instruments hadn't been coded to law before does not mean they hadn't existed as concepts in the Finnish
4Whenever referring to the minimum capital requirement (MCR), I mean speciﬁcally the Finnish version in which the
capital must be invested as share capital. The speciﬁcs of the requirement may vary across countries.
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ﬁnancial markets). In addition, the proposal aimed to simplify regulations about decision making relating
to the gathering and distribution of companies' assets, and extend their disclosure duties. Hence, there
were a few smaller changes, some potentially easing and others potentially complicating the operations
of a limited company. However, the change in the MCR seems to have been the biggest single piece of
the reform.
The 2006 reform is a more complicated case, since in it the entire law was replaced, and the original
government proposal (Finlex, 2005) did not even include the MCR change. The main objectives seem
to have been to decrease and lighten formalities, and increase the dispositive aspects of the law. There
was also a stated special focus on the state of small limited companies, with proposals for both lightened
bureaucracy and material easing for small companies. These kind of elements may very well work to
inﬂate the estimates for the eﬀects of the MCR. The identiﬁcation strategy used in this thesis, described
later in section 4.1, is tailored to be sensitive to changes in the MCR especially, but it is likely that the
ﬁrms that beneﬁt from the lowering of the MCR are mostly small and also beneﬁt from the other reforms
aimed at small ﬁrms.
That the MCR changes in 1997 and 2006 were parts of larger reforms complicates things, but at the
same time emphasizes why it is extremely interesting to have access to two reforms of the same regulation,
with the added bonus of them moving into opposite directions, and - nominally speaking at least - with
similar magnitudes. Observing signiﬁcant eﬀects in both cases would increase the likelihood that the
MCR is the cause, while only having such results in one or the other would raise the question of whether
it is some other regulation that either independently causes the eﬀect or is needed in combination with
the MCR.
2.3 Measuring Firm Dynamics
Measuring ﬁrm dynamics, speciﬁcally the entry and exit of businesses, is notoriously troublesome. A
degree of arbitrariness is already included in the decision to focus on the yearly number of entries instead
of, for example, quarterly or multiple-year ﬁgures. Also, it is by no means clear when a ﬁrm enters a
market or when should it be counted as having exited. Is the proper starting date the date a business
is oﬃcially registered, the date any economic activity is ﬁrst observed or the date the date the business
hires its ﬁrst employee or crosses some arbitrary turnover threshold? Has the business exited only once it
goes bankrupt or is oﬃcially removed from the register, or when economic activity is no longer observed?
What if a business goes on a hiatus and continues economic activity after two years of silence - should it
be counted as one entry or two entries and one exit? To muddy the picture further, one has to ask what
is a true entry and a true exit: how should one treat mergers, acquisitions and spin-oﬀs, for example, and
how can one even detect these in the data?
The literature has taken several approaches to deal with these problems. Decker et al. (2016) for
instance use establishment level data to assign an age for each new ﬁrm identiﬁer they observe in the
data based on the oldest establishment said ﬁrm operates (where the startup year is deﬁned as the ﬁrst
year the ﬁrm hires an employee). Hence a new ﬁrm is only a true entrant if all its establishments are
new too. The ﬁrm is then allowed to age one year at a time as long as the ﬁrm identiﬁer is observed in
the data, regardless of any mergers and acquisitions along the way, and ﬁrm growth rates are calculated
as averages of establishment level growth rates in order to only account for organic growth. Azoulay,
Jones, Kim, and Miranda (2019) use the same data set to identify true exits and exits by acquisition.
This is possible by tracking whether the establishments of a ceasing ﬁrm also disappear from the data.
Arguing that the owner(s) of a successful venture might decide to exit by selling their idea and the assets
embodied in their ﬁrm, they categorize all acquisitions as successful exits. It may be, though, that
some owners are forced to sell even if they'd prefer continuing, in which case it is questionable to call
an acquisition a successful exit. However, short of asking the owners themselves, this kind of distinction
can be very hard to identify, further illustrating that the interpretation of exit especially is not always
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straightforward.
Another novel approach to measuring ﬁrm dynamics was proposed by Bendetto, Haltiwanger, Lane,
and McKinney (2009). It utilizes employer-employee data to identify entry, exit, mergers and acquisitions
via the movements of clusters of employees between ﬁrms. Four conditions5 are formed and their com-
binations used to identify movement categories. An obvious drawback of this method is the necessity of
setting up arbitrary thresholds for the number of employees whose movement is considered signiﬁcant and
the time period in which the transitions need to be observed. It is also practically necessary to leave out
the smallest ﬁrms (i.e. the majority of ﬁrms), since, for instance, observing one individual transitioning
from a one-employee business to some other business is hardly evidence of an acquisition - it could just
be for example that a solitary entrepreneur exits and gets employed by another company.
Figure 2
The Statistics Finland data provides information on the ﬁrms' legal founding dates. Figure 2 shows a
bar chart of the frequencies of disagreements between entry deﬁned as the ﬁrst time a ﬁrm is observed in
the panel and the legal starting year assigned to it. A disagreement of zero means that the ﬁrst appearance
is the same as the legal starting year, while a disagreement of 1 implies that the legal starting year is the
year before the ﬁrst observation (and vice versa for -1). For most of the ﬁrms the two deﬁnitions either
agree or the ﬁrst observation happens in the year following the legal founding, which also makes sense
taking into account the fact that a ﬁrm has to have operated for at least six months to be included in the
panel. Given the deﬁnition, one would expect to see no negative disagreements. However, there are some
- though relatively few - ﬁrms like this. These might simply be erroneous codings of the entry date. On
the positive side the disagreements drop sharply after one. However, it takes them a while to completely
51: The predecessor exits (i.e. falls below the employment threshold) and the average employment at the predecessor over
the chosen time period is less than 10% of the predecessor's employment prior to the transition, 2: 80% of the predecessor's
current employees transition to the successor, 3: The successor is an entrant (i.e. rises above the employment threshold),
and the average employment at the successor over the chosen time period is less than 10% of the successor's employment
after the transition, and 4: 80% of the successor's employees after the transition came for the predecessor.
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die oﬀ - in fact, though the graph cuts oﬀ at 19, there are a few ﬁrms with more than a hundred years
of positive disagreement in the data.
Also included in the Statistics Finland data is establishment level information. This allows for the
calculation of entries and exits following the methodology mentioned above (Decker et al., 2016; Azoulay
et al., 2019). A problem with imposing these additional requirements on the deﬁnitions is the question of
how one should deal with the ﬁrms that do not fulﬁll these requirements: should they all be considered
incumbents? Following the principles of partial identiﬁcation famously promoted by Charles F. Manski
(see e.g. Manski (2015)), one can consider what can be concluded if nothing is assumed about them. In
that case, only intervals for the outcomes of interest can be identiﬁed: the lower bound is obtained by
treating all the ﬁrms in question as incumbents, and similarly the upper bound is obtained by treating
all of them as entrants or exiters, with the true value guaranteed to lie somewhere in between of the
bounds (though, without additional assumptions, the true value is equally likely to lie anywhere within
the bounds). Still, it should be noted that this identiﬁcation region is certain to hold the true rate only
in the given sample. In order to generalize it to the entire population of interest, one needs to further
assume away any selection bias when it comes to missing data.
In what follows, the ﬁrst appearance of a ﬁrm as a statistical unit (i.e. exceeding the thresholds
mentioned in the previous section) in the panel is used as the baseline deﬁnition of entry. The ﬁrm then
ages one year at a time until it is never observed in the panel again, at which point it is considered to
have exited. The year 1988 is discarded as it is the ﬁrst year any ﬁrm can appear in the panel and hence
all ﬁrms are by deﬁnition entrants. The years 1989 and 1990 are also dropped as they exhibit very high -
probably mechanistically inﬂated - counts of entrants compared to the other years. The last year in the
data, 2017, is not considered when describing exits, but is included for other purposes.
The magnitude of the potential error stemming from the deﬁnition of entry is illustrated in section
2.5's ﬁgure 3, which graphs the entry rate in Finland over the study period. The bolded line corresponds
to the baseline deﬁnition, i.e. the upper bound of the identifying region. The shaded area is the iden-
tifying region, with the lower bound corresponding to a stricter deﬁnition of entry where two additional
requirements are imposed: all the entrant's establishments must also be observed for the ﬁrst time, and
the disagreement between the legal founding year and the ﬁrst observation is either zero or one. Note
that the denominator - the total number of ﬁrms - stays the same between these two ways of deﬁning the
entry rate. For most of the study period, the correlation between the upper and lower bounds is nearly
perfect, though the diﬀerence in magnitude is not negligible. Only during the ﬁrst years the deﬁnitions
completely disagree not only on the magnitudes but also on the direction of the trends. This is most
likely explained by the fact that a merger of information systems at Statistics Finland has left a lot of
empty establishment identiﬁers in the data for the years 1989-1995 (Statistics Finland, 2015). Because
the diﬀerence in magnitudes between the baseline and the stricter deﬁnition is so large, the stricter deﬁ-
nition is used for purposes of robustness checking (the estimates presented in section 4 are mostly quite
robust to the deﬁnition of entry - see appendix A.4).
For exits, only the baseline deﬁnition is used. One reason is that legal exit dates are available only
for relatively few of the ﬁrms that exit according to the baseline deﬁnition. A potential explanation is
that many ﬁrms may stay in existence on paper for a long time after ceasing economic activity, since
the cost of doing so is not high and it leaves open the possibility of restarting the business, or using the
same legal entity for entirely diﬀerent business activities in the future. Even so, one could still make the
deﬁnition stricter by imposing only the establishment-level criteria. However, in that case, with survival
probabilities and growth rates one would also need to obtain another ﬁrm identiﬁer that is considered to
be the continuation of the ﬁrm that doesn't exit by the stricter deﬁnition, as the original ﬁrm identiﬁer
has no more observations. This would require making some arbitrary assumptions. For instance, if a ﬁrm
with a single establishment is acquired by one with ten establishments, the latter should probably not
be treated as a simple continuation of the former. Similarly, one would need to decide what happens to
a multi-establishment ﬁrm that is broken up and merged into several other companies.
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Finally, there are multiple measures one could use when determining the size of a ﬁrm. The most
common measures are the turnover and the number of employees. The latter will be adopted as the
measure in this thesis for a couple of reasons. First reason is technical: since the panel of data used spans
nearly three decades, as well as two currencies, inﬂation becomes a major question for the comparability
of size in terms of turnover over time. While inﬂation adjustment is certainly possible, employment
provides a more directly consistent and easily interpretable measure of size. The second reason is more
subjective: job creation is a widely shared objective among policy makers, and though I'll remain agnostic
as to whether this should be the case, I believe most readers will be more interested in the potential
employment eﬀects that might be uncovered than the eﬀects on ﬁrms' turnovers. The third an ﬁnal reason
is practical: employment is usually the measure of choice in the previous research used to contextualize
Finland's situation below, and hence adopting it makes comparison more straightforward. Thus, from
now on, when discussing the calculations made with the Statistics Finland data, size and growth will
refer to the number of employees.6
2.4 Stylized Facts on the Growth of Firms
Before exploring the trends highlighted in recent studies on ﬁrm dynamics, it is useful to establish a
few empirically robust observations which provide crucial context for interpreting everything that will
be discussed afterwards. Coad (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on ﬁrm growth.
This section brieﬂy summarizes a few of the most relevant empirical ﬁndings presented therein. All the
studies mentioned up to the subtitle Transformational and subsistence entrepreneurship are presented
as cited in Coad (2007).
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the size distribution of ﬁrms is positively skewed. While there is
disagreement on the exact form of the distribution with some authors (e.g Gibrat, 1931; Prais, 1956;
Simon and Bonini, 1958) suggesting a log-normal distribution and others favoring the Pareto distribution
(e.g. Steindl, 1965; Ijiri and Simon, 1964; 1971; 1974) with some ﬁnding that disaggregating the data
actually reveals messier multimodal distributions (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003; Bottazzi et al., 2005), the
observation that there are few very large ﬁrms and a lot of small ﬁrms is not in question.
Relatedly, the relative growth distribution of ﬁrms has robustly been observed to be fat-tailed, with
high probabilities of both extremely high growth and contraction. Some studies (e.g. Stanley, 1996) ﬁnd
a ﬁt to the symmetrical Laplace distribution, while others (e.g. Reichstein and Jensen, 2005) prefer the
right-skewed exponential distribution. Generally speaking, it seems that the median ﬁrm exhibits little
to no growth while some ﬁrms grow and others contract very fast.
Furthermore, there appears to be a negative correlation between ﬁrm size and growth - small ﬁrms
grow (on average and in relative terms) faster than large ones (e.g. Kumar, 1985; Dunne and Hughes,
1994; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003). Since age and growth are highly correlated, there is also a negative
correlation between age and growth. In fact, some authors (e.g. Fizaine, 1968; Evans 1987b) argue that
the causal relationship is actually between age and growth rather than size and growth.
Transformational and subsistence entrepreneurship
Focusing especially on the impact of startups in the U.S. economy, Decker et al. (2014) argue that the
majority of the growth contribution of young ﬁrms is driven by a few very high growth ﬁrms while
the median entrant exhibits practically no growth, even conditional on survival. This phenomenon is
not surprising in light of the stylized facts discussed above. Part of the explanation probably lies in the
proposition of Schoar (2010), who, summarizing a wealth of evidence especially from the developing world,
proposes that a distinction should be made between at least two diﬀerent kinds of groups: subsistence
and transformational entrepreneurs. The former group are self-employed people or business founders
6Speciﬁcally, when speaking of the Statistics Finland data, employees are expressed in full time equivalent units. This
means that, for instance, two half-time-employees constitute one full-time-employee.
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whose main objective is to provide a living for the entrepreneur and possibly their family, but who have
no ambitions of growing their business further. The latter meanwhile go into entrepreneurship in hopes of
growing a business beyond the subsistence needs of the entrepreneurs themselves, providing employment
for others in the process.
While Schoar's argument is mainly focused on the developing world, I share the view pointed out by
Decker et al. (2014) that the distinction is relevant for the developed world as well. Signiﬁcant support
for this view comes from the survey evidence of U.S. business founders reported by Hurst and Pugsley
(2011) who ﬁnd that only around one third of new businesses have a product or service that they want
to bring to the market, while most business founders cite non-pecuniary motivations such as being their
own boss and the ﬂexibility of being a small business owner. While there is a further distinction to be
made between subsistence entrepreneurs who set up a business because they have no alternative source of
income and non-pecuniary beneﬁt -seeking entrepreneurs who might be quite well of working as employees
if they didn't opt for setting up a small business, in terms of employment growth the categories are so
close that I will mainly use the term subsistence entrepreneur as shorthand for referring to both.
2.5 Is Business Dynamism in Decline?
Evident from the previous discussion is that creative destruction indeed seems to play a signiﬁcant role
in the development of modern economies, with young high-growth ﬁrms contributing a disproportionate
share of economic activity. This casts an ominous light on some of the recent ﬁndings in empirical
literature presented next, and motivates the search for potential remedies - for example the removal of
entry barriers such as the minimum capital requirement.
The main point of this section is that recent studies have noted trends in ﬁrm dynamics which suggest
evolution towards an increasingly stagnant business environment across the developed world. Below,
these trends are presented and subsequently compared to the speciﬁc case of Finland, using the data
described in section 2.1.
The entry rate
The ﬁrst sign of the dynamism of an economy is the entry rate, i.e. the ratio of entrant ﬁrms to all ﬁrms.
Generally speaking, a high entry rate is seen as a positive phenomenon, since it suggests a supportive
business environment for entrepreneurs to try new ideas. Hence questions have been raised on what
appears to be a global (at least across the developed world) phenomenon of a recent decline in entry
rates. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2014) observe a fall in the U.S. entry rate from 12.0
percent in the late 1980s to 10.6 before the Great Recession, after which it drops sharply below 8 percent.
An OECD study shows that similar trends are also evident at least for many European countries, Brazil,
Canada and New Zealand (Calvino, Criscuolo, and Menon, 2015).
Figure 3 plots the entry rate for Finland over the study period. The bolded line corresponds to
the baseline deﬁnition, while the shaded area is the identifying region with its lower bound expressing
the entry rate if all the ﬁrms not fulﬁlling the additional requirements described in the section 2.3 are
considered incumbents. In case one trusts the baseline deﬁnition, the evolution of the entry rate is very
similar to that observed in the U.S. by Decker et al. (2014). The entry rate starts above 12%, drops
below 10% after 1997 and makes a modest return just before the Great Recession, after which it sinks
to its lowest points at below 8%. This is not only qualitatively but also quantitatively close to the U.S
case. The overall downward trend doesn't change much when considering the lower bound, though the
levels drop quite a lot below the U.S. ﬁgures. The massive width of the interval in the ﬁrst few years is
most likely due to the problem in the older establishment-level data already mentioned in section 2.3.
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The shaded area is the identifying region with the lower bound corresponding to the stricter definition of entry.
Entry Rate in Finland, 1991-2017
The entry rate is broken down by legal form in ﬁgure 4 (using the baseline deﬁnition). An interesting
observation emerges from this picture: while all legal forms exhibit downward trends, limited companies
go through a curious dip with the fall and rise happening around the times of the reforms in the minimum
capital requirement. Are the reforms responsible for these shifts? A few pieces of evidence suggest that
they play a role, though do not explain the whole pattern. First, consider the ﬁrst reform in 1997. The
steep fall of the entry rate for limited companies begins already in 1995, that is, clearly before the reform.
However, at the same time the other legal forms also experience a downturn, suggesting some larger
change in the macroeconomic environment. Then, as the rate for limited companies keeps falling, the
other legal forms level oﬀ in 1997. This would be consistent with entrepreneurs choosing to incorporate
with one of the other legal forms as barriers to setting up a limited company get higher. Remarkably,
the opposite pattern is observed near the second reform in 2006. All legal forms turn to positive growth
already in 2004, but the rest experience a slight downturn in 2006, while limited companies continue high
growth for another year, before joining the rest in the Great Recession.
The entry rate for limited companies can be further broken down by the shares of companies founded
at or above the minimum capital requirement threshold in the years for which data is available. Taking
an average of ﬁrms starting in the years 2002-2005, one ﬁnds that, before the 2006 minimum capital
requirement reform, around 60.5% of limited companies were set up at the limit, that is, with a share
capital of 8000 euros. Repeating the exercise for the years 2007-2016 reveals that as the requirement is
lowered to 2500 euros, the share of ﬁrms set up at the minimum jumps up to 75.0%. Unsurprisingly,
this is driven by a signiﬁcant increase in ﬁrms founded at the minimum requirement - while the number
of ﬁrms founded above the threshold increases slightly, the number of those founded at the threshold
roughly doubles compared to the pre-reform years. Meanwhile the number of ﬁrms founded around the
old threshold of 8000 (plus or minus a thousand) euros drops by an order of magnitude. This suggests
that not only are more entrepreneurs willing to set up a limited company when the minimum capital
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requirement is brought down, but also that most of those who might have been willing to do it at 8000
euros prefer the new minimum of 2500 euros.
Figure 4
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The size and growth of young ﬁrms
While the entry rate is an important indicator, it alone does not suﬃce to draw conclusions about the
contribution that young ﬁrms are bringing to the economy, since it might be that the ﬁrms not entering
anymore would mostly have been run by the subsistence entrepreneurs who had no intentions to grow
anyway. Only when observing the development of the size of the entrants as well as their growth some
years after entry can we begin to evaluate the total contribution.
Decker et al. (2014) note that the average size, measured in employees, of U.S. startups has remained
approximately the same or declined over the three-decade period from early 1980s to early 2010s depend-
ing on the data source. The same ﬂat or downward trends hold for all the countries in Calvino et al.
(2015) as well, albeit with a signiﬁcantly shorter study horizon (2003-2012 at best). As a consequence,
not only the share of young ﬁrms but also their overall contribution to economic activity is declining.
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As elsewhere, the declining entry rate in Finland is not being oﬀset by larger entrants, at least in terms
of employment. Figure 5 shows the mean employment of entrants in their ﬁrst six years of operation. A
few interesting observations arise. Firstly, the mean employment of a cohort at entry seems to predict its
mean employment each year after that quite well. Closely related is the fact that the downward trend is
present not just in the employment of entrants, but persists as they age and, notably, as less successful
ﬁrms drop out. Finally, the biggest growth seems to happen in the ﬁrst year. It should be noted that
here the growth in the mean employment can be due both to the actual growth of the surviving ﬁrms
and the dropping out of ﬁrms at the bottom of the size distribution.
Seeking evidence for the eﬀects of the minimum capital requirement, ﬁgure 6 plots the average size
in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of limited corporations versus the other legal forms with entry years divided in
three periods: before 1997, 1997-2006 and after 2006. Here the mean is calculated with respect to the
original size of the cohort, i.e. ﬁrms that exit stay in the denominator while contributing zero to the
numerator. This emphasizes the importance of the entry rate: on average, once a cohort has entered,
its employment growth stays ﬂat - the growth of the growing ﬁrms only manages to oﬀset the jobs lost
by the ﬁrms that shrink or exit. It is also clear that limited companies are much more prone to create
jobs, a possible motivation to incentivice setting them up. However, the MCR doesn't appear to have
an immediately obvious eﬀect on the mean employment growth of a cohort. The employment of limited
companies is on average between six and eight for ﬁrms starting before the ﬁrst reform and between the
reforms. However, after the second reform there is a dramatic drop to around four. This reﬂects the
declining trend already observed in ﬁgure 5.
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If the entry rate was declining, but it was only the subsistence entrepreneurs who no longer went into
business, there might be less cause for concern. The declining size of entrants, however, points potentially
to less transformational entrepreneurs. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2016) present further
worrying evidence from the U.S. They ﬁnd that the skewness in the growth distribution of young ﬁrms
has also been declining since 2000, reﬂecting a sharp decline at the 90th percentile, since the median ﬁrm
continues to exhibit very little growth. While the entry rate and average size of entrants exhibit similar
trends in Finland as in the U.S., the distributional development of the growth rates seems to diverge
somewhat. Following Decker et al. (2016), ﬁgure 7 plots the evolution of the diﬀerence between the 90th
and 50th percentiles of the employment growth rate distribution for young and mature ﬁrms. Letting
Eit denote the employment of ﬁrm i at time t, the growth rate is deﬁned as
γit =
Eit − Eit−1
0.5 ∗ (Eit + Eit−1) (1)
As in the case of the U.S., the 90-50-diﬀerential for young ﬁrms in Finland declines when approaching
the year 2000, but then levels oﬀ at the turn of millennia and rises sharply towards the end of the
study period in contrast to the ﬁndings of Decker et al. (2016), who observe a continuing decline for the
U.S. all the way to the 2010s (though their data only extends to 2012). Digging deeper into the 90-50
diﬀerential, one ﬁnds that, since the median ﬁrm exhibits little to no growth, this measure of skewness
almost perfectly mirrors the growth of the 90th percentile ﬁrm (this is true for both young and mature
ﬁrms, and in both the U.S. and Finland). Hence while the rate of entry and average size of entrants have
decreased, there appears to be no similar decline in the growth of the highest growing young ﬁrms.
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Exit and survival
The ﬁnal piece in the dynamism-puzzle is the development of the exit of ﬁrms. This can be viewed
from two angles: the exit rate, i.e. the ratio of exiting ﬁrms to all ﬁrms in a given period, and survival
rates, i.e. the share of businesses of a given age that continue to the next period. The interpretation of
exit and survival rates as signs of the health of an economy is somewhat less straightforward than that
of entry rates and growth rates of young ﬁrms, increases in which can be generally viewed as positive
developments. On the one hand, high survival and low exit rates imply success and stability on the level
of individual ﬁrms, which surely is desirable. On the other, as Calvino et al. (2015) for instance point out,
they can be imbued with a contrary interpretation: short survival times are a sign of healthy dynamism,
with companies allowed to easily enter the market with risky business strategies and then exit quickly or
grow depending on their success.
Looking at the overall exit rate - the ratio of exiting ﬁrms to total ﬁrms - in the U.S., Decker et al.
(2016) ﬁnd that it does not exhibit a similar secular decline as the entry rate, instead varying around
the 9% level from 1979 to 2011. Meanwhile Calvino et al. (2015), focusing on the exit rate of young
(less than three years old) ﬁrms ﬁnd that in the 2002-2012 period the trend has varied somewhat more
across countries than the entry rate or the size of entrants, though in most cases it has remained ﬂat
or increased slightly, with a few countries (e.g. Spain, New Zealand and especially Belgium) exhibiting
more pronounced increases.
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Figure 8 plots the exit rate in Finland separately for young and mature ﬁrms, as well as for all ﬁrms
pooled together. Interestingly, one observes an initial fall until around the ﬁrst reform,7 followed by a
leveling-oﬀ and then an increase after the second reform. The trends are similar for all ﬁrms, though more
pronounced for the young ones. This may suggest that, under the high MCR, there is less competitive
pressures driving ﬁrms to exit, or the ﬁrms operating in the market are more stable as they have had
to make higher initial investments (though this shouldn't matter for the early post-reform-years of the
mature ﬁrms).
To look behind the exit rate, one can investigate the survival of ﬁrms as a function of age. Doing this in
the Finnish case reveals another reason why policy makers might want to incentivice entrepreneurship in
the form of limited companies. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 9 which plots Kaplan-Meier survival functions
separately for limited corporations and the other legal forms pooled together, showing clearly superior
performance by limited companies in terms of longevity. Even if the policy makers have preferences
for dynamism rather than stability, though, one might still expect them to ease the barriers of limited
incorporation, that being the legal form that allows higher risk-taking.
Figure 9 pools together all available time periods to estimate the survival as a function of age. To look
at its development over time, ﬁgure 10 plots the Kaplan-Meier estimates separately for three periods,
corresponding with the three diﬀerent MCR regimes. One might expect higher minimum capital require-
ments to also raise the survival times of limited companies. In ﬁgure 10a this seems to be the case for the
ﬁrst eight years: companies founded in the years of high capital requirements (1997-2006) have higher
survival probabilities for the ﬁrst years, but though the ﬁrms founded after the second reform have lower
probabilities for all available ages, the ﬁrms founded before the ﬁrst reform have higher probabilities for
ages beyond 10 years. This might reﬂect larger changes in the business environment (e.g. the 2008 crisis)
7There is a spike after the reform, but some of this this may reﬂect the problem discussed in section 2.1 that in the data
the coding of ﬁrms identiﬁers changed from 1998 to 1999 when natural persons' personal identiﬁers were replaced by ﬁrm
identiﬁers.
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with the older established ﬁrms being more resilient to them.
Meanwhile, if managers substitute for limited incorporation by choosing to incorporate with the
other legal forms, one might expect an eﬀect to be observable also for non-limited companies: as capital
requirements rise, some managers that would have otherwise set up a limited company choose non-limited
incorporation instead. If we assume that these marginal managers are on average more talented than
those who would have set up a non-limited company in any case, then the eﬀect would go in the same
direction as for limited companies. Indeed, ﬁgure 10b shows that the pattern is the same as in the case
of limited companies with those ﬁrms starting in the era of higher capital requirements showing larger
survival probabilities, in this case up to 13 years and with more pronounced diﬀerences than in the limited
company case.
Whether the aforementioned developments are caused by the chances in the MCR or some other
changes in the business environment (or both) remains inconclusive, but the patterns of the survival
functions are consistent with what one might expect to see. In any case, they document a recent decline
in ﬁrms' survival probabilities: survival probabilities in the post-2006 period are the lowest they've been
during the study period for ﬁrms of all (available) ages. For both limited and non-limited companies, the
young ﬁrms born under the high MCR regime between 1997 and 2006 have higher survival probabilities
than in the low MCR periods, but whereas the 1996-1996 cohorts seem to catch up with the high MCR
cohorts as they get older, the post-2006 cohorts are left lagging behind.
Figure 9
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Figure 10
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Industry concentration
With the entry rate declining, the size and growth of entrants staying the same at best and their survival
probabilities falling, the overall contribution from young ﬁrms is indeed on the decline. Hence the engines
of creative destruction are slowing down, and insofar as the performance of mature incumbent ﬁrms'
isn't falling to the same degree, this implies a decline in business dynamism beyond any aggregate shocks
aﬀecting the entire economy (young and old ﬁrms alike). One way this can be expected to materialize is
in the concentration of industries, with a small number of ﬁrms commanding an increasingly large share
of the market in any given industry. Recent studies have found that this seems to be the case, at least
for the U.S.
Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2017) document a rise in average product market
concentration on the four-digit level across a variety of measures and industries. Depending on the in-
dustry, the rise begins somewhere from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, and is especially high in ﬁnance,
services, utilities and transportation and retail, with manufacturing and wholesale showing slightly less
marked increases (though they exhibit higher levels to begin with). The authors note that the trends
are more pronounced when measured in sales rather than employees (though still clearly visible using
the latter measure in most cases), implying that ﬁrms are increasingly able to achieve higher shares of
industry sales with fewer employees. De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2017) go beyond concentration,
exploring the evolution of markups, which they argue is a better measure of market power, since concen-
tration usually relies on arbitrarily setting the boundaries of a market and might hence reﬂect product
diﬀerentiation rather than actual market power. They ﬁnd that markups have also risen sharply since
the 1980s from about 20% to 30% above marginal cost to around 60% in 2014.
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Similarly to Autor et al. (2017), ﬁgure 11 plots the concentration in Finnish industries, measured as
the average CR4 and CR208 of industries in larger sectors,9 using both turnover (CR4 T & CR20 T)
and employment (CR4 E & CR20 E) as measures of size. In contrast to the U.S. case, Finnish industries
seem to exhibit little increase in concentration when measured in employment, although there is perhaps
a slight upward trend in the CR20 of manufacturing (the levels are mostly similar, though they should not
be considered very comparable due to diﬀerent data sources and industry groupings). When measured
in turnover, the trends are similarly ﬂat for most of the study period, except for the very end where
each sector seems to undergo a sudden jump around 2013. However, recall from section 2.1 that this
corresponds to a major reform of the statistics gathering at Statistics Finland, and since the correlation
between the employment and turnover measures up to that point is nearly perfect, and there is no such
rise in the employment measures, this jump is most likely explained by the discontinuity in the gathering
of data.
Summarizing the Finnish trends
In conclusion, it seems that Finland shares some of the trends of declining business dynamism observed all
across the developed world. The entry rate as well as the size and growth of entrants is on a downward
path, with the survival of young ﬁrms also declining over time. Taken together, these developments
imply a fall in the overall economic contribution of young ﬁrms. The development of the overall exit rate,
meanwhile, seems to correspond well with the reforms in the MCR with higher rates of exit under the
lower requirements.
Where Finland diverges at least from the U.S. is in the growth distribution of ﬁrms and the concen-
tration of industries. There is no apparent decline in the growth rates of the highest growing Finnish
startups, even if the averages of the entrants seem to be declining. This suggests that Finland's prob-
lem may be a higher share of subsistence entrepreneurs rather than declining growth on the part of
transformational entrepreneurs. There also appear to be nowhere near as drastic hikes in industry con-
centration in Finland as in the U.S, suggesting that the declining performance may be more symmetrically
experienced by established ﬁrms as well.
These trends together raise the question of whether or not it makes sense for the Finnish policy makers
to lower the barriers of entry. The decline in the entry rate seems to be a secular trend shared by many
nations, and lowering entry barriers will most likely provide only brief relief. This is evident for instance
in ﬁgure 4, where the overall trend for all legal forms is going downwards despite the jumps potentially
caused by the altering of the MCR. Meanwhile, if the falling size and growth of entrants is driven by
an increasing share of subsistence entrepreneurs rather than falling growth among transformational ones,
lowering entry barriers is only going to amplify this trend. Also, there appears to be no evidence that the
higher MCR would be protecting incumbents to the extent that industries would increase in concentration.
At the same time, though, it's not clear what potential negative consequences a lower MCR might
have. One reason worth mentioning is that the MCR may protect consumers and debtors from fraudulent
companies. Furthermore, a lower MCR may make it easier for black market operators to set up front
companies, a concern raised by the tax administration following the recent removal of MCR in Finland
(Muilu, 2019). These questions are beyond the scope of this thesis, however. To explore what the
potential consequences - positive or negative - may be in terms of ﬁrm dynamics, the next section reviews
some theoretical frameworks dealing with entrepreneurship and ﬁrm dynamics.
8The sum of the sizes of the four in case of CR4 and twenty in case of CR20 largest ﬁrms in an industry divided by the
total size of that industry
9Autor et al. (2017) use four-digit industries and six sectors, whereas ﬁgure 11, consistently with the rest of this thesis,
uses ﬁve-digit industries. The sectors are combinations of the one-letter level sectors of the standard industrial classiﬁcation
of 2008 used by Statistics Finland (see Statistics Finland (2008)). Appendix B lists the one-letter sectors belonging to each
sector-title used in the text.
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3 Theoretical Predictions for the Eﬀects of the MCR
This section brieﬂy presents a number of theories that help to predict and contextualize the eﬀects the
minimum capital requirement might have on ﬁrm dynamics. In the following discussion the MCR will be
treated as belonging to a ﬁrm's entry cost. One might argue that it should more appropriately be viewed
as an investment instead since it stays in the ﬁrm. However, the fact that an overwhelming majority10
of limited companies are founded with the minimum required amount suggests that this investment is
unnecessary for most ﬁrms, and treated like a cost by potential entrepreneurs. At the very least, the
MCR constitutes an opportunity cost for the entrepreneur, as it restricts the choices one can make with
their disposable wealth.
To help organize the various implications arising from the discussion, I'll consider the predicted eﬀects
of a reform that lowers entry costs for all ﬁrms - such as the 2006 MCR reform11 - on ﬁrm dynamics piece
by piece. Calvino et al. (2015) break the economic contribution of young ﬁrms down to four components:
the entry rate, the average size of entrants, the survival rate and the average growth of survivors. In
addition, one needs to consider the size, growth and survival of incumbent ﬁrms to arrive at the total
economic contribution of all ﬁrms.
3.1 Entrepreneurial Traits and Preferences
The question of how changes in the MCR will reﬂect in the number and performance of entrants crucially
depends on who the potential entrepreneurs are and what is driving their decisions. In simpliﬁed models
the main driving force is usually a single parameter, whether that be talent, risk aversion or preference
for entrepreneurship. In the real world, however, the decisions may also reﬂect behavioral biases that
make them less than optimal.
Ability and the role of information
A signiﬁcant view within the theory of entrepreneurship considers the entry decision and subsequent
performance of ﬁrms as a function of the entrepreneurial ability of a ﬁrm's founder. Within this view,
contrasting two canonical models - those of Lucas (1978) and Jovanovic (1982) - illustrates an important
distinction arising from the awareness of the agents. In both models, potential entrepreneurs are hetero-
geneous in their ability12, with more talented individuals performing better in the market after entry. The
diﬀerence comes form whether the potential managers know their ability or not: Lucas' entrepreneurs are
perfectly informed while Jovanovic's only learn about their eﬃciency from market signals after entering.
Starting with the number of entrants, there isn't much disagreement on what the qualitative eﬀect of
the cost-lowering reform should be. In both models, the agents maximize expected utility, and a higher
entry cost will reduce the expected utility from entrepreneurship regardless of the outcome,13 which means
that less agents will want to become entrepreneurs. Lowering the MCR, then, should unequivocally yield
higher entry numbers. It is in the post-entry performance where interesting diﬀerences start to appear.
If the potential entrepreneurs are fully aware of their ability, a higher entry cost excludes only those
who are not talented enough to achieve net positive value under it. Thus the Lucas-model implies a
cut-oﬀ level in ability, with everyone above that ability going into entrepreneurship and everyone below
it choosing wage-employment, and a trade-oﬀ between the quantity of entrepreneurs and their average
ability. Since ability drives performance, one would then expect to see that the marginal managers,
who would have chosen wage-employment under a higher MCR, end up running smaller businesses and
exit quicker, so that the averages of survival and employment fall.
1060-75% depending on the time period according to the data used here (see section 2.5)
11Note that strictly speaking the 2006 MCR reform lowered entry costs for all limited companies rather than all ﬁrms, a
distinction that is ignored for brevity in this section but should always be kept in mind when interpreting the results
12Note that Jovanovic speaks of ﬁrms rather than entrepreneurs or managers and eﬃciency and costs rather than talent,
but the diﬀerent labeling doesn't change the role these parameters play in the model.
13It should be noted, though, that Lucas does not explicitly model an entry cost while Jovanovic does.
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In the other extreme where the entrepreneurs learn nothing about their ability before entry, the entry
cost will have no bearing on the average ability of any given cohort. Note, though, that there may still be a
fall in the average performance stemming from the fact that there is now more competition in the market.
However, in contrast to Lucas, the entrepreneurs that are encouraged to enter are no worse than those
who would have entered in any case. Recalling the empirical fact that the size and growth distributions
of ﬁrms are highly skewed, a high MCR in a Lucas-world would then cut out ﬁrms from the low-end of
those distributions, while in the world of Jovanovic it would randomly cut out ﬁrms from all across the
distribution, leading to a much greater negative impact in total. This brings us to a point that is worth
emphasizing: the impact of the reform is largely determined by the extent to which those entrepreneurs
that are going to be successful know that they are going to be successful! If success is highly correlated
with the preconceptions of the entrepreneur, the most promising entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs
regardless of the costs, so that the reform will have little impact. Meanwhile, if entrepreneurship is more
a process of trial-and-error, even modest cost-lowering reforms can have big eﬀects as the group of people
choosing entrepreneurship under the new regime will include a few high-impact entrepreneurs with some
probability.
It seems plausible that reality is somewhere in between the Lucas and Jovanovic worlds: potential
entrepreneurs probably have gained some signals from other activities, but are not quite certain of their
abilities. Thus, one would expect the average performance of entrepreneurs to fall with the entry cost,
with the fall being greater the more entrepreneurs are aware of their ability, and the total impact being
more positive the less aware they are.
Preferences: risk aversion and non-pecuniary beneﬁts
Another standard explanation for the entry decision is heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion among
the workforce. Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979) develop a general equilibrium model based on this idea. In
their model the agents can choose to become an entrepreneur or a worker with entrepreneurship providing
a risky proﬁt while employment pays a risk-free endogenously determined wage. In the equilibrium,
more risk averse agents choose the safe employment while less risk averse ones become entrepreneurs.
Similarly, of those that become entrepreneurs, the less risk averse ones end up running larger (in terms of
employment) ﬁrms. In this scenario, then, the decision to become an entrepreneur as well as to grow ones
ﬁrm is a function of the preferences of the agents with no need for some agents to be better at running
a business than others. Whereas in the Lucas- and Jovanovic-models those ﬁrms that became large were
run by more able managers, here success is a matter of luck with willingness to take a gamble a necessary
- but, importantly, not a suﬃcient - condition.
A notable feature of the Kihlstrom-Laﬀont model is that its equilibrium is in general ineﬃcient with
respect to the number of ﬁrms and allocation of labour. There are two opposing forces at play behind
the ineﬃciency: on the one hand risk aversion causes too few agents to choose entrepreneurship, while
on the other hand risk aversion among those who do become entrepreneurs causes them to hire sub-
optimally which in turn lowers the equilibrium wage and creates an incentive for too many agents to
become entrepreneurs. Hence there are generally too few or too many entrepreneurs, depending on the
speciﬁcation of the parameters. This highlights the notion that more entrepreneurship is not necessarily
better.
Assuming risk aversion to be the driving factor behind entry does not really change the predictions
for the number of entrants. A decrease in the MCR still raises utility for all outcomes if one chooses
entrepreneurship, leading to a higher expected utility from entrepreneurship regardless of ones risk at-
titudes, so that more agents will choose entrepreneurship. Furthermore, note that the agents on the
margin that are encouraged choose entrepreneurship under a lower MCR will be more risk averse also in
their decisions to grow the company. Thus one would expect to see smaller entrants and lower growth.
The eﬀects on survival are more ambiguous and depend on the options the entrepreneurs have. In the
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Kihlstrom-Laﬀont-model, an entrepreneur that exits simply becomes a wage-employee, i.e. unemploy-
ment does not exist and ﬁrms do not go bankrupt. With this sort of speciﬁcation, highly risk-averse
agents should also exit quicker, because upon receiving a negative shock they will rather switch to em-
ployment that guarantees a certain income than wait for their luck to turn. On the other hand, if there
is a possibility of bankruptcy or unemployment, more risk averse agents could be expected to make less
risky moves and hence survive for longer.
In addition to diﬀerent preferences for risk, individuals may also vary in their preferences for other
dimensions of entrepreneurship. Recall from section 2.4 that survey evidence suggests most entrepreneurs
to be motivated by factors other than money, such as ﬂexibility and being their own boss (Hurst and
Pugsley, 2011). In other words, entrepreneurs gain non-pecuniary beneﬁts from being an entrepreneur
- entrepreneurship is a good in itself. Inspired by this, Hurst and Pugsley (2015) present a model of
entrepreneurial choice based on the preferences for business ownership. In addition to the preference-
heterogeneity, there are diﬀerent industries which are deﬁned by their ﬁxed costs. In each industry, a good
may be produced by a small ﬁrm owned by an agent, or a corporation that employs agents. The agents
decide whether to use their labour as employees in the corporate sector or small business owners, in which
case they also decide which good to sell (i.e. which industry to enter). In each industry the ﬁxed costs
determine an eﬃcient scale of employment, and the agent-operated ﬁrms are restricted to one employee
(the owner) while the corporate ﬁrms can employ as many agents as they want. As all entrepreneurs
are looking to get their non-pecuniary beneﬁts with as little cost as possible, and the industries do not
diﬀer in their ability to generate these beneﬁts, the result is a cutoﬀ-point for ﬁxed costs, below which
all goods are produced by small business owners and above by corporations.
It's again not hard to see that a decrease in the MCR - a reform that lowers the ﬁxed cost for all
industries - will result in an increase in the number of entrepreneurs (i.e. the share of industries operated
by agent-owned businesses). However, it is important to note that the Hurst-Pugsley-model is explicitly
not trying to explain diﬀerences in ex-post performance of ﬁrms. In fact, it completely abstracts away the
dynamics of small business formation and growth, treating all entrepreneurs essentially as sole proprietors
without employees. The implications of non-pecuniary motives for the post-entry performance of ﬁrms
then mainly depends on how important one believes them to be relative to monetary motives that make
entrepreneurs seek growth.
If their relative importance is high (as evidence suggests, see section 2.4), most of the new entrants
resulting from the reform would be concentrating in small scale industries with little intentions of growing.
If we suppose that the growth-seeking transformational entrepreneurs are high-ability individuals who
are at least to some extent aware of their abilities, we'd expect them not to be discouraged by slightly
higher entry costs. The result of lowering costs, unless with a large amount, would then mainly be an
inﬂux of subsistence entrepreneurs to the economy. On average, we could then expect smaller entrants
exhibiting lower growth. The eﬀects on survival could conceivably go to the other direction though, as
survival is still an objective for subsistence entrepreneurs, perhaps even more so than transformational
entrepreneurs, who may be more likely to follow an up-or-out strategy.
Note that while the existence of non-pecuniary beneﬁts thus seems to have broadly negative impli-
cations for the performance of ﬁrms, as Hurst and Pugsley point out, this does not need to imply losses
in utility in a world with non-pecuniary beneﬁts. In a utilitarian sense, the decreased performance can
be acceptable if the entrepreneurs are in fact suﬃciently happier even if their productivity may be sub-
stantially lower than it would be if they worked as employees for someone else. While this is important
to keep in mind when interpreting the results, it should also be once more emphasized that the Hurst-
Pugsley model speciﬁcally models the decision of the so-called subsistence entrepreneurs and stays silent
on transformational entrepreneurs - the ones who are looking to grow in the ﬁrst place and hence likely
to have a bigger economic impact. The welfare eﬀects will critically hinge on how the latter group is
aﬀected by entry barriers.
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Variety in traits and preferences
While the discussed theoretical frameworks agree that lower entry costs lead to an increase in the number
of entrants, and most point to a decrease in their average potential, they may have diﬀerent implications
on the magnitude of the eﬀect. An important factor here is the extent to which the parameters driving
the decisions take on diﬀerent values. Hombert et al. (2017) consider the implications of diﬀerent talent
distributions for the standard Lucas model. They point out that if the potential entrepreneurs are very
heterogeneous with respect to their abilities, raising the expected returns from entrepreneurship14 has a
small positive eﬀect on the entry rate but a large negative eﬀect on the average quality of the entrants,
while the case of homogeneously talented potential entrepreneurs leads to opposite conclusions. This
is because, in the former case, there are few marginal managers just below the threshold who are
encouraged to enter due to the reform, but on the other hand the ability of these marginal managers is
substantially lower than of those already in the market. On the contrary, in the case of the homogeneous
distribution, there is a large mass of managers on the margin who will choose entrepreneurship due to
the reform, and the ability of these managers is not that much lower than of those already in the market.
Note that this argument only applies if talent is known - the distribution should not matter for managers
unaware of their ability.15
Thus, if known talent is the driving force, the impact of the reform depends a lot on its distribution.
However, the same argument applies just as well if the driving factor is (known) risk aversion or non-
pecuniary utility gained from entrepreneurship instead of ability: a lot of variation in either one is going
to lead to a small response in terms of entry numbers as long as the entrepreneurs are making rational
calculations with perfect information. This, of course, is a dubious assumption in the real world, where
the decisions of entrepreneurs may reﬂect biases and heuristics. Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, and Weber (2014)
provide a review of some insights from behavioral economics research on entrepreneurship, which are
important to take into account when considering the potential eﬀects of the MCR on one hand, and
justiﬁcations for such regulation on the other. The next subsection brieﬂy summarizes and comments on
this review. The other studies mentioned are presented as cited in Åstebro et al. (2014).
Insights from behavioral economics: overconﬁdence
Åstebro et al. (2014) introduce a few observations that are especially pertinent to motivating behavioral
concerns in the context of entrepreneurship. One is a study by Hall and Woodward (2010), calculating
that the very low probability of success should make the expected utility of entrepreneurial ventures
negative for normal degrees of risk aversion. Another is the fact that, despite this, entrepreneurship
not only exists but is relatively prevalent (Parker 2009). Finally, entrepreneurs also exhibit the kind
of persistence that an objective observer might deem irrational - they keep running their businesses for
long times despite low returns (Hamilton 2000; Åstebro 2003; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002).
Åstebro et. al. also cite experimental evidence by Holm, Opper and Nee (2013) that ﬁnds no diﬀerence in
risk attitudes between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, suggesting that the puzzle is not explained
to a satisfactory degree by the proposition that some subset of the general population has very diﬀerent
attitudes towards risk. This clearly casts doubt on the predictive power of the Kihlstrom-Laﬀont-model.
The non-pecuniary beneﬁts discussed in the previous subsection provide one potential explanation
for the above observations, especially the irrational persistence, and are indeed brought up by Åstebro
et. al.. While Hurst and Pugsley (2011; 2015) were mainly interested in the question of why some
entrepreneurs are content staying small, Åstebro et. al. also point out potentially utility producing
factors that seem especially relevant for the entry decisions of the so-called transformational entrepreneurs:
14Speciﬁcally, they consider a guaranteed allowance for all entrepreneurs in case of failure, i.e. insurance. However, an
entry cost is just a negative allowance regardless of success, so its eﬀect is to lower the expected returns and the conclusion
is qualitatively the same.
15A caveat to this is that if the entrepreneurs are risk averse but unaware of their ability while still knowing the distribution
of the ability parameter, less variance in the ability distribution would imply less risk and hence more entrants under the
new regime.
27
pride in bringing one's own business idea to market success, competitiveness, and - related to the previous
paragraph - risk itself.
However, arguably the most relevant contribution from behavioral economics to research on en-
trepreneurship is the concept of overconﬁdence, which does a lot to explain why entrepreneurs exist
despite the well-known weak odds of success. Åstebro et. al. follow Moore and Healey (2008) in diﬀer-
entiating three more precise biases that are often referred to using the general term of overconﬁdence:
overestimation, overplacement and overprecision. The ﬁrst refers to a general tendency to view one's own
ability as higher than it is, while the second diﬀers in that it requires a direct assessment of one's own
ability relative to some comparison group - here you place yourself higher in the relative skill distribu-
tion than you really are, whereas in overestimation you exaggerate your absolute skill level. Finally,
overprecision refers to excessive certainty about one's ability. Note that one can underestimate or under-
place their skill while being overprecise: you might for instance be very sure that you are a lot worse at
something than other people, while in reality having quite average abilities.
Overestimation and overplacement bias one's expected returns to the positive direction and hence
can intuitively be expected to increase the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. Following Weinstein
(1980), Åstebro et. al. further distinguish the related, often observationally equivalent trait of optimism,
which refers to a general attitude of good things will happen (in contrast to overestimating or overplacing
oneself in a speciﬁc situation). The eﬀects of overprecision meanwhile are not as straightforward, as it
might make some people undervalue exploration (It's not worth trying, I know I'm not good enough as
opposed to Maybe it will work or maybe not but I won't know without trying).
The implications of overconﬁdence on the eﬀects of a cost-lowering reform then depend on the speciﬁc
form of the bias as well as, to a large extent, on the prevalence of such biases among the diﬀerent groups
under consideration. For instance, one might conjecture that if entrepreneurs are more overestimating or
optimistic (a hypothesis with some empirical support according to Åstebro et. al.), they would be less
sensitive to variation in the entry cost, since they would be expecting to succeed anyway. Overplacing
on the other hand - if prevalent in the whole population - might work to reinforce the gain in the entry
rate following a lowering of costs, as the increased competition would be dismissed in the calculations of
potential entrepreneurs.
The diﬀerent forms overconﬁdence takes also have implications for whether or not it is desirable to
try and curtail the excessive entry they it may cause - for instance by increasing entry barriers. As
Åstebro et. al. point out: while overestimation and optimism may trigger the pursuit of breakthrough
innovations with strong positive externalities, overplacement may primarily lead to entry into already
contested markets, and it may be associated more with imitation. Hence, while overplacement may still
indirectly foster innovation through increased competition within a market, the potential positive exter-
nalities are much less clear. Furthermore, higher entry barriers may deter individuals who overprecisely
underestimate their ability, even if they may potentially be very capable entrepreneurs.
One can also raise an evolutionary question of how overconﬁdence is selected for in the market: do such
a traits increase or decrease the entrepreneur's chances of survival? If overconﬁdence is highly correlated
with the decision to go into entrepreneurship but detrimental in the long run, the incumbents would be
on average less overconﬁdent,16 and the entrants that drop out quickly would be the most overconﬁdent.
Such mechanics would provide an alternative explanation for the up-or-out dynamics of young ﬁrms and
provide an avenue for interesting future research, but for current purposes the main implication is that, if
this indeed is the case, the lowering of entry costs might bring in slightly less overconﬁdent entrepreneurs
with better chances to survive and grow
16Though such an eﬀect might just as well be the result of learning.
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3.2 Aggregate Eﬀects and Conditions
While the traits and preferences of individual entrepreneurs can help explain their decision to enter and
subsequent performance, and thus have implications on the eﬀects of a reform that changes the incentives
of entry, further investigation is needed to investigate the potential aggregate eﬀects such a reform might
have. After all, it might be that any gains made by entrants are negated by losses on the side of incumbent
ﬁrms. Furthermore, the broader economic conditions in play at the time of a reform may aﬀect the eﬀects
of the reform itself.
Entry and exit in a stationary equilibrium
Drawing from two stylized facts from empirical studies - that ﬁrm dynamics are dominated by ﬁrm-speciﬁc
uncertainty and that the entry and exit rates are highly correlated across industries - Hopenhayn (1992)
presents the classic long run equilibrium model of ﬁrm dynamics in which ﬁrms face a series of individual
productivity shocks and then optimize the timing of their exit. New ﬁrms must make a nonrecoverable
investment before they observe their ﬁrst shock, which is qualitatively equivalent to them being unaware
of their ability - thus entrants face conditions similar to the Jovanovic-model. The novel contribution of
Hopenhayn is to derive a stationary equilibrium which includes entry and exit - in contrast to previous
models where they had converged to zero in the long run and been in that sense only a transitory
mechanism on the way to the equilibrium. This provides a tractable framework for analyzing the long
run eﬀects of changes parameter such as the entry cost. The drawback is that the analysis is necessarily
simplistic: for example, the entry and exit rates are equal by deﬁnition in the stationary equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the Hopenhayn model has a few interesting predictions for our discussion. The ﬁrst
results are very intuitive: a higher entry cost decreases entry - and hence also exit - and increases the
expected lifetime of ﬁrms through decreasing selection. The eﬀect on the size distribution of ﬁrms is
less straightforward as there are two opposing forces at play: an increase in the entry cost has a price
eﬀect and a selection eﬀect. The former refers to the fact that with less competition the output price
increases leading to higher output and employment decisions across the possible shocks a ﬁrm might
receive. On the other hand the decrease in competition means that there will be a higher fraction of
ﬁrms receiving lower shocks (i.e. decreasing their output and employment) since they won't be selected
out. The relative strength of the two eﬀects is determined by the parameters of the shock process and
the production function.
Aggregate ﬂuctuations
Whereas the previous models have mainly considered uncertainty as ﬁrm-speciﬁc, Clementi and Palazzo
(2016) extend the Hopenhayn-framework to an economy with aggregate ﬂuctuations by letting the pro-
ductivity of an individual ﬁrm be the product of an idiosyncratic shock and an aggregate shock common
to all ﬁrms. Their modeling choices are in part motivated by the empirical observation that the entry
rate is procyclical while the exit rate is countercyclical. Intuitively this makes sense: a positive aggregate
shock makes entry more appealing and exit less appealing. It is what follows from the modeling choices
made that has notable implications for the MCR reforms.
Whereas Hopenhayn's interest was in providing a stationary equilibrium framework that could be used
for what essentially amounts to analysis of comparative statics, Clementi and Palazzo aim to model the
impulse responses of an economy with entry and exit. Their main result is that, compared to an economy
without them, entry and exit propagate the eﬀects of aggregate shocks, boosting the persistence and
unconditional variation of aggregate quantities. To see why, consider what happens with a positive shock
to aggregate productivity. Initially, ﬁrms with worse idiosyncratic shocks will now ﬁnd entry proﬁtable,
increasing the number but decreasing the average productivity (which equals the aggregate productivity
in this case, since there is a unit mass of ﬁrms). The immediate eﬀect is small, however, due to the fact
that the output share of entering ﬁrms is small. In any cohort of entrants, some ﬁrms grow while others
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exit, owing to their idiosyncratic shocks. Since the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is the same
regardless of the size of the cohort, a larger cohort implies more young ﬁrms that will keep growing. Add
to this the fact that, for a given amount of capital, ﬁrms with higher idiosyncratic shocks (i.e. ﬁrms that
will grow more) are on average younger (since if a ﬁrm with a low shock has a lot of capital, it has had
to have the change to build up that capital earlier when it had a higher shock), and the result is that the
eﬀects of the aggregate shock persist for a long time via the disproportional contribution of the cohort(s)
born under the positive circumstances. Opposite arguments apply to a negative aggregate shock, with
smaller cohorts of entrants resulting in more sluggish growth relative to normal times, compared to the
case of no entry or exit. Indeed, the authors argue that an exceptionally large drop in the entry rate
following the 2008 crisis is a major explanation for the slow recovery from it.
As in Hopenhayn's model, Clementi and Palazzo also include a ﬁxed cost that each ﬁrm must pay
upon entry. While they don't focus on exploring changes in that cost, in light of the propagation eﬀects
being mainly a function of the size of any entrant cohort, it's quite clear what the qualitative eﬀect
is: a higher cost implies less entrants for any shock, and hence less propagation of positive and more
propagation of negative aggregate shocks. It's important to recognize how the sort of propagation the
Clementi-Palazzo-model proposes can confound any estimation of the eﬀects of entry barriers: exactly
the same change in the level of the MCR, for instance, might have diﬀerent causal eﬀects under diﬀerent
macroeconomic conditions!
In sum, the only truly uncontested prediction derived from the theories discussed in this section is that
the number of entrants moves to the opposite direction with the level of the entry cost. Another quite clear
implication is that the survival probability of incumbent ﬁrms should fall. All the other components are
up to debate, though the size and growth of entrants are unlikely to move to the opposite direction as the
level of the entry cost. The survival of entrants and the growth rates of incumbents could go either way,
and the total eﬀects of changes in the entry cost will depend on the magnitudes of the individual changes
in all the components relative to each other. Furthermore, they may depend on other aggregate shocks
experienced by the economy as highlighted by the Clementi-Palazzo model, which makes the external
validity obtained from the investigation of any individual reform at least quantitatively uncertain. For
example, if the economy is hit by a negative shock shortly following the reform, it may recover substantially
faster than it would have in absence of the reform, even if in normal times the reform would have had
little eﬀect. This becomes especially interesting for our speciﬁc discussion considering the fact that the
2006 reform was shortly followed by the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
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4 Estimating the Eﬀects of the MCR
To test the predictions explored in the previous section, and evaluate the impact of changing entry
barriers, I will make use of a long panel of Finnish ﬁrms, encompassing two reforms in the minimum
capital requirement of limited companies. The data was presented in section 2.1, and the reforms as well
as other necessary institutional background detailed in section 2.2. An important point regarding the
reforms is that they were national reforms, aﬀecting all ﬁrms in Finland - limited companies directly and
other companies indirectly - at the same time. This makes distinguishing the potential causal eﬀects of
the reform from other shocks aﬀecting ﬁrm dynamics complicated, as it is diﬃcult to construct a credible
control group that would not be aﬀected by the reform. The identifying strategy explained in detail
below tries to get around this problem by making use of the varying extent to which diﬀerent industries
are aﬀected. That is, the basic idea is to compare changes in industries that are expected to be more
aﬀected by the reform to changes in industries that are expected to be less aﬀected. The results of the
approach are presented in section 4.2.
4.1 Estimation Strategy
To distinguish the potential causal eﬀects of the MCR reforms from other factors aﬀecting ﬁrm dynamics
in the study period, I make use of a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy with heterogeneous treatment
intensity across industries similar to Klapper et al. (2006) and Hombert et al. (2017). The idea of the
estimator is simple: industries are ranked according to the treatment intensity (i.e. some index that
reﬂects how much a given industry is expected to be aﬀected by the reform), and the estimates are then
obtained by comparing how the outcomes of interest change with the explanatory variable under study
depending on the level of treatment intensity.
Following Hombert et al. (2017), once the treatment intensity rankings are obtained, the industries
will be divided in groups based on the rankings. While they deﬁne industries on the 4-digit level and
group them into treatment intensity quartiles, with Q1 expected to be the least aﬀected by the reform
and Q4 the most aﬀected, I choose to deﬁne the industries at the 5-digit level instead to have the
ﬁrms in the identiﬁed industries be as close competitors as possible. This is especially important when
considering the eﬀects on the incumbents - the looser the deﬁned industries, the harder it will be to detect
such competitive mechanisms. To maximize within-group precision in the outcomes and between-groups
variation in treatment intensity, as discussed in more detail below, I also divide the industries into three
groups instead of four, with G1 containing the third of industries with the smallest and G3 those with
the largest treatment intensities.
The identiﬁcation strategy can be expressed as the following equation:
Yit = α+ λt + µi +
3∑
k=2
βk
(
Gki ∗ postt
)
+ it (2)
where Yit is the outcome of interest for industry i and the cohort of ﬁrms starting in year t, α is a
constant, λt refers to entry year- and µi to industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Gki are indicators equal to one if the
industry belongs to the kth group (G1 being the reference group) and postt is a dummy equal to one for the
post-reform period. βk are the coeﬃcients of interest, giving the average treatment eﬀect for the industries
in the kth group of treatment intensity. The main eﬀects for postt and Gki are excluded, since they are
linear combinations of λt and µi respectively. Note that the estimates of treatment eﬀects obtained in
this manner are necessarily relative to G1 industries. They can only be treated as absolute estimates of
the eﬀects by assuming that any changes in G1 industries are wholly unrelated to the reform. Thus, the
estimates obtained for the eﬀects on the number of entrants, for instance, are likely to understate the
actual changes in entry numbers attributable to the reform.
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Treatment intensity, assumptions and measurement error
The reform Hombert et al. (2017) study was aimed at unemployed individuals with limited capital who are
more likely to start low-scale ﬁrms, so they expect industries with a larger fraction of sole proprietorships
to be more aﬀected. Hence, they deﬁne treatment intensity as the fraction of sole proprietors in an
industry. Meanwhile Klapper et al. (2006) use the industry's natural propensity of entry (proxied by
the entry rate in the U.S. where entry costs are assumed to be the lowest) as the treatment intensity
index: industries with higher natural entry are expected to be more aﬀected by higher entry costs. As the
interest here is in what happens when one alters the MCR, the amount of ﬁrms founded at that threshold
provides a natural measure for an industry's treatment intensity. Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne the treatment
intensity as the average pre-reform ratio of the number of entrants founded with the minimum required
share capital to the total number of limited company entrants. Due to the fact that the share capital
data is available only for the years 2002-2016, the averages are taken over 2002-2005 and straightforward
estimation is limited to the 2006-reform.
The intuition behind the treatment intensity measure is that the MCR is less of an obstacle for ﬁrms
in industries where a higher share of entrants invest more than required in any case. The identifying
assumption is then that, without the reform, the changes across industries would not have been system-
atically related to this measure of treatment intensity, i.e. the outcomes of interest would have followed
parallel trends across the treatment intensity groups. As will be discussed in more detail later, depend-
ing on the outcome, the plausibility of this assumption ranges from imperfect to nonexistent. However,
the imperfection does not seem too drastic for the most interesting results - namely those regarding the
number and performance of limited company entrants - not to be at least qualitatively credible.
As the industries are deﬁned at high speciﬁcity, many of them become quite small. This increases
the likelihood of extreme deviations from true treatment intensity in the measure used. For instance, a
lot of industries with few limited entrants per year may end up having measures of one or zero, even if
the actual intensity they face is nowhere near so extreme. This decreases the accuracy of the treatment
intensity measure, and makes detecting eﬀects less likely. For this reason, all industries with less than
50 companies on average in the 2002-2005 and 2007-2017 periods are dropped out of consideration (this
leaves around three hundred industries for estimation). However, there is always a possibility that such
systematic dropping of observations biases the results. Importantly, the results are not robust to including
all industries (see appendix A.4). Thus, if one wants to generalize the results to the entire set of industries
and not just the set of industries used for estimation, one needs to assume that the lack of robustness is
due to the measurement error and not due to selection issues (assuming of course that the main identifying
assumption of parallel trends holds for the set of industries that are included).
Some additional assumptions are needed to make use of all the available information in the data at
hand. In the case of the 2006 reform, if one assumes that the ranking of industries based on the treatment
intensity is stable over time, one can also include the years 1998-2001 to the pre-reform period. This is
done in the main results, though the estimates are also mostly robust for including only 2002-2005 (see
appendix A.3).
Finally, note that in both cases, the reform went into eﬀect in the beginning of September. Hence, as
observations are made on a yearly level, both the 1997 and 2006 cross sections include ﬁrms founded both
before and after the respective reforms. In most estimations then, the reform years 1997 and 2006 are
ignored. This will also somewhat alleviate worries of expectation eﬀects, where potential entrepreneurs
might wait on entering until the MCR is lowered, or rush to enter before the MCR is raised.
The 1997 reform
The case of the 1997 reform is slightly more complicated, as there is no share capital data for the
close years either before or after the reform. Furthermore, the ranking constructed using the pre-reform
period of the 2006-reform corresponds in turn to the after-reform period in relation to the 1997 reform.
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However, one can construct a slightly diﬀerent treatment intensity measure, the ranking of which should
nevertheless highly correlate with that of the measure deﬁned above. This is done by taking the cross
section of limited companies in 2002, keeping only those that were founded between 1991 and 1997, and
dividing the number of ﬁrms in an industry that have the pre-reform minimum amount of share capital17
with the total number of ﬁrms in that industry. Note that there is no need to assume that the ﬁrms
founded with minimum capital are not less likely to exit than those founded with more, as long as they
exit at similar rates across industries. Using this proxy is possible because the 1997 reform did not force
existing ﬁrms to raise their share capital (although some did so18 - thus another implicit assumption
made is that the raising happened at similar rates across industries). Because the treatment intensity
measure for the 1997 reform is less reliable, the estimates will mainly serve as a robustness check for the
2006 results, and a more detailed discussion will focus on the latter. Even so, one would expect the eﬀects
to be at least qualitatively opposite to each other. As discussed later, this is not quite the case, though
there are several potential explanations, not all of which invalidate the results for the 2006 reform.
Outcomes
To holistically evaluate the eﬀects of a change in the MCR on ﬁrm dynamics, it's important to consider
not only how many new ﬁrms (if any) are created as a result, but also how the quality of those new
ﬁrms changes, and how the incumbent ﬁrms react. Only with that information can one conclusively
say what the total eﬀect of the reform is. The outcomes described below attempt to unearth all of the
aforementioned information, but in practice results with any information value are only obtained for the
ﬁrst two questions. However, it is still in itself informative to see how the other outcomes fail to be
informative, and discuss why this might be the case.
To begin, the eﬀects on the employment contribution of entrants are evaluated. Following Calvino
et al. (2015), this can be broken down to the number, size and survival of entrants as well as the growth
of surviving entrants. As in their report, I will speciﬁcally consider the three-year survival and growth of
new ﬁrms. This is ultimately an arbitrary decision with a trade-oﬀ between the number of cohorts that
can be included and the number of years each cohort can be followed. As a robustness check, the analysis
is repeated for one- and ﬁve-year survival and growth, which does not change the picture much, though
one obtains quite precise zeroes for the diﬀerences in one-year survival (see appendix A.4). Meanwhile,
since a ﬁrm's entry size in the data at hand already includes whatever growth has occurred before the
ﬁrm is measured for the ﬁrst time, I will not estimate the eﬀects on it separately. Hence, to estimate the
entrants' contribution, the outcomes used in equation 2 are
1. The number of entering ﬁrms (in logarithms19)
2. The share of a cohort surviving to age three
3. The average size (in logarithms) of three-year-old ﬁrms
Theoretically, the product of these three terms should equal the total three-year employment contribution
of an entering cohort. To check if this holds, I also estimate the eﬀects on the contribution directly using
the (logarithm of) the total employment of three-year old ﬁrms.
Note that there are two ways to deﬁne the outcomes when it comes to the legal forms of the ﬁrms.
Firstly, one could only count limited companies, which are the only ﬁrms directly aﬀected by the reform
17Note that the pre-reform requirement is in a diﬀerent currency than the data, which has been converted to euros for
the entire period. In the data, the modal value of the share capital in the relevant range is 2 526.3 euros, but there are also
many ﬁrms coded as having a share capital of exactly 2 500 euros. Hence all ﬁrms with a share capital in the range of 2500
to 2530 inclusive are taken to have minimum capital, whereas in the numbers based on 2002-2005 only ﬁrms with exactly
8 000 euros are counted.
18In fact, it appears that ﬁrms were technically required to raise their share capital, but around 50 000 ﬁrms, or half of
all limited companies at the time, did not adhere to the requirement, and it was eventually dropped in the 2006 reform
(Federation of Finnish Enterprises, 2005; 2006).
19The number- and size outcomes are transformed to natural logarithms to decrease the noise arising from the fact that
there are large diﬀerences in scale between the industries and individual ﬁrms.
33
(and usually considered to be more economically signiﬁcant than the other forms). Indeed, this is the
approach that will be taken in all subsequent initial estimations. However, that approach alone misses an
important part of the potential eﬀects, namely the substitution between the diﬀerent legal forms. Thus,
after obtaining the estimates when only limited companies are included, the regressions will be repeated
with each of the four legal forms included in the outcome measures. In theory, comparing the results
from these two parts of the estimation process should give us an idea of the signiﬁcance of the role of
substitution: if for instance the results for number of entrants imply a lot of new ﬁrms when considering
only limited companies, but signiﬁcantly less when all legal forms are included, this might be because
the new limited companies would have been set up as some other form, absent the reform. In practice,
though, the identifying assumption of parallel trends is substantially more plausible when only limited
companies are included, so the estimates for all legal forms should be interpreted with caution.
It should also be pointed out that the estimated eﬀects obtained in this fashion are averages over the
post-reform period. However, as the phenomenon under study is inherently dynamic, there are potential
confounding eﬀects from feedback loops, i.e. the eﬀects might diﬀer depending on the length of the
post-period. For instance, competition might be a negative feedback loop in the sense that high entry in
one year might discourage entry in the next due to an increasingly saturated marketplace. If this is the
case, the further one moves away from the reform, the smaller the diﬀerence in entry numbers between
industries aﬀected to diﬀerent extents might get as the initial jumps in levels die down. Thus, the
estimated eﬀect might get smaller as years are added to the post-reform period, and not only because the
addition of more observations decreases the likelihood of extreme results. Importantly, in this scenario,
the eﬀect should get systematically smaller as one moves away from the reform. Hence, as a robustness
check, for each outcome of interest, the post-reform period is split into three sub-periods - 2007-2010,
2011-2013 and 2014-2017 - for which equation 2 is estimated separately. It turns out that this is not a
substantial concern - the results, presented in appendix A.3, do not systematically change to one direction
as one gets farther away from the reform (though they do not stay constant either - in fact it appears
that the middle period 2011-2013 often obtains the largest estimates in absolute value, highlighting again
the uncertainty related to the magnitude of the eﬀects).
To make a ﬁnal estimate of the total employment eﬀects of the reform, on would also need to know
what eﬀects it has on the ﬁrms already in the market. On paper, this can be estimated utilizing the
same estimation strategy used here for the entrant outcomes. However, this approach has some inherent
problems. Whereas in the case of entrants one can estimate the eﬀects averaged over the entering
cohorts, in the case of incumbents there is only one group of ﬁrms for which it makes sense to estimate
any eﬀects: those that were in existence in the immediate pre-reform period (i.e. in 2005) - any cross
section in the post-reform period already includes post-reform entrants, and any previous cross-section
might include ﬁrms that have already exited before the reform ever takes place.20 To estimate the eﬀects
on incumbents, then, one can take the cross section of ﬁrms in existence in 2005 and follow their numbers,
average employment and total employment contribution (all in logarithms). Note that since substitution
can't play a role here, all legal forms can be straightforwardly included in the estimation.21
This estimation, though, is a lot less reliable than in the case of entrants due to the lack of ability
to average over cohorts. This leads not only to less observations, but also potential problems with
extreme observations. If the years 2005-2006 for instance happen to be exceptionally good or bad for
the incumbents of some industries due to some unrelated shocks, followed by regression to mean in the
post-reform period, one might get erroneous results. Furthermore, the potential causal chain from the
reform to incumbent outcomes is a lot less direct, and as the incumbents are on average signiﬁcantly
larger than entrants, other confounding characteristics may become more of a problem (as even in the
20Strictly speaking, some of the ﬁrms existing in 2005 might still exit before the reform. However, the 2006 cross sections
would already include post-reform entrants, so the earlier year is preferred.
21One might wonder, though, if estimations including only limited companies would yield estimates that make more sense,
as seems to be the case for entrant outcomes. However, this does not appear to be the case in practice - while the estimates
are omitted here for brevity, I did run regressions to test this.
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entrant case the trends are unlikely to be perfectly parallel).
The concerns over the dynamic nature of the eﬀects raised in the context of entrants also apply even
more so here. It might be that the increased competition causes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the exit rates
of the incumbents shortly following the reform, but that the eﬀect fades over time as the passing of
time drops all but the most robust incumbents out of the industries regardless of the level of treatment
intensity.22 The same approach of splitting the post-period into three parts is followed to check if these
concerns matter in the time frame under study. Again, little pattern emerges, though for the reasons
mentioned the results are very uninformative to begin with.
As the results for incumbents are ambiguous, a better approach to evaluating the total eﬀects of
the reform might be to directly use the (logarithm of the) total industry employment as the outcome
variable. This has the advantage of again being able to average over longer periods both before and after
the reform. However, the estimation strategy also runs into trouble here. Namely, the treatment intensity
groups clearly exhibit diﬀerent trends prior to the reform, so that even though one does ﬁnd results that
suggest increasing employment with the treatment intensity, it is again impossible to say without further
information what part of it is due to the reform. It is likely that the total employment eﬀects are inﬂated
by job creation coming from incumbents due to unrelated factors.
In total, equation 2 is estimated for 13 outcomes in the main results, eight of which consist of the
four entrant outcomes - log number, three-year survival, log mean employment at age three and log total
employment of a cohort at age three - evaluated separately with only limited companies and all legal forms
included, three are the incumbent outcomes - log number, log mean employment and log total employment
- which are only evaluated with all legal forms, and ﬁnally two are the log total industry employments
with only limited companies and all legal forms. Out of these the entrant outcomes, speciﬁcally when only
limited companies are included, yield the most interesting results. Due to the diﬃculties in estimating
the eﬀects on the incumbent outcomes or total employment, the overall eﬀect of the reform remains
somewhat of a mystery.
Discussion on the treatment intensity groups
As is evident from the above discussion, there are several ways one could present the basic information
obtained from this type of estimation. One is the approach adopted by Klapper et al. (2006) where the
continuous measure of treatment intensity, or a rank based on it, is used directly in the estimation. The
advantage of this approach is that it avoids the arbitrary grouping of industries that is necessary in the
approach of Hombert et al. (2017). However, two reasons lead me to favor the latter approach in the
main results of this thesis.
Firstly, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients is much more straightforward with the grouping approach.
In the case of the single-variable approach, the interpretation of the coeﬃcient is (roughly) either the
change in the outcome when one increases the treatment intensity by one unit or the change in out-
come when one moves up a rank in the treatment intensity ranking. While this is qualitatively easy
to understand, contextualizing such an estimate quantitatively becomes complicated. In contrast, the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients with grouping is the average change in outcome in group X. As it is
straightforward to calculate the pre-reform averages for the outcomes in any given group, this allows one
to express the size of the estimated eﬀects in intuitive terms with some rough calculations.
Secondly, the single-variable approach only produces a single coeﬃcient estimate, which has a higher
likelihood of being consistent with whatever hypotheses are made purely by chance, as interest tends
to focus on the sign and signiﬁcance of that single coeﬃcient. Having at least three groups provides an
additional automatic check of the sensibility of the estimates: if the assumptions behind the strategy hold
and an eﬀect exists, the estimates should monotonically increase or decrease as one moves from a lower
22Indeed, if we had access to an inﬁnite post-period, one would expect the estimated eﬀect to converge to zero as at some
point all incumbents exit, making the diﬀerence at that point zero, but years keep being added to the denominator of the
average treatment eﬀect.
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treatment intensity group to a higher one. Grouping also allows one to directly detect potential non-
linearities, whereas the single-variable approach without further investigation ﬁxes a linear interpretation.
With the grouping approach, the next question becomes the number of groups one should use. The
simplest grouping would be to split the industries in two, which would give a single coeﬃcient with the
interpretation of the average change in outcome for industries with above median treatment intensity.
However, this defeats the second beneﬁt of grouping mentioned in the previous paragraph. Hence, in
my view, if one is going to use grouping, one should use at least three groups. Whether to include more
than three groups is a more complicated question, and depends on the data at hand. Each additional
group obviously decreases the number of observation inside any given group, and hence the within-group
precision of any estimation. Furthermore, the between-group variation in the treatment intensity measure
declines with the addition of more groups, as the bounds for each group get tighter and the in-group
averages get closer together. On the other hand, the conﬁdence in the obtained results rises the more
they are robust to increasing the number of groups: the likelihood of observing monotonically increasing
or decreasing eﬀects by chance decreases as one increases the number of groups.
Table 1: Distribution of the treatment intensity measure for diﬀerent groupings
Group
Three groups Four groups Five groups
Mean Max N Mean Max N Mean Max N
1 0.083 0.117 130 0.074 0.108 99 0.066 0.101 79
2 0.138 0.156 131 0.124 0.141 99 0.113 0.125 79
3 0.235 0.514 135 0.154 0.171 99 0.140 0.150 79
4 0.261 0.514 99 0.164 0.187 79
5 0.280 0.514 80
Summary statistics of the distribution with and without the 50 ﬁrm minimum threshold
Threshold Min p5 p25 Median p75 p95 Max Mean N
Yes 0 0.050 0.108 0.141 0.172 0.331 0.514 0.153 396
No 0 0 0 0.125 0.166 0.330 1 0.133 679
In the main results of this thesis, I choose to use three groups, which maximizes the within-group
precision in outcomes and the between-group variation in treatment intensity, while still providing the
sensibility check mentioned above. This is in contrast to Hombert et al. (2017), who use four groups in
their main results. The reason I opt for three instead of four is illustrated in table 1, which describes
the distribution of the treatment intensity measure (the last rows) and the mean and maximum values it
takes inside groups using three diﬀerent groupings: three, four and ﬁve. The main message of the table
is that the variation in the pre-reform share of minimum capital entrants is quite low for most of the
distribution: the diﬀerence in the values between the 5th and 75th percentiles is nearly the same as the
diﬀerence between the 95th and 75th percentiles. This leads to the lower treatment intensity groups in
all groupings to have close average treatment intensities while the highest group is always clearly above
the others. This means that any eﬀects in the low intensity groups become substantially harder to detect
when more groups are added (importantly, though, it also means that even the in the three-group case,
the diﬀerence between the highest group and the rest is driven by the industries with the very highest
intensities). This is borne out in the estimations for the four- and ﬁve-group cases, which are presented
in appendix A.1: the estimates for the highest group change surprisingly little for any outcomes, while
the estimates for the lower groups are not robust to the addition of more groups.
Another important point to notice about the distribution of the treatment intensity is that setting the
ﬁfty-company size threshold for industries to be included changes it signiﬁcantly (see the last two rows of
table 1). Recall from the discussion above that the likelihood of extreme observations in the treatment
intensity measure is larger for smaller industries. Indeed, in the no-threshold distribution there are a
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lot more industries with zero-intensity. On the other hand, the maximum is also cut to half when the
threshold is imposed, and the maximum ends up being barely a majority for minimum capital -entrants.
This is curious considering the fact that the share of all limited company entrants with minimum capital
on average before the reform is as high as 65% (see section 2.5). This suggests that the industries with
higher treatment intensities that fall below the threshold may have in total a lot more entrants than
those falling below the threshold with lower treatment intensities (especially since the number of limited
company entrants for the included industries is the highest in group two in the three-groups case, as seen
in table 2). Thus, a lot of the eﬀect in terms of absolute limited companies founded may go undetected
(though the average relative per industry eﬀect may even be biased upwards - note that the mean intensity
is slightly higher when the threshold is imposed).
Having explored the nature of the variation available for estimation and settled for three treatment
intensity groups, a reality check on the characteristics of these groups is in order. After all, there probably
are reasons why some industries have a lower share of limited companies entering with minimum capital
than others, and, depending on the circumstances, these reasons may very well confound the results
obtained. Table 2 presents summary statistics over the 1998-2005 period for diﬀerent outcomes by the
three treatment intensity groups used in the estimation of the eﬀects of the 2006 reform. It's immediately
obvious that the groups are not homogeneous in terms of the outcomes before the reform. Of course,
this is not a problem for the estimation strategy as long as the development of the outcomes follows sim-
ilar trends. However, the heterogeneity might reﬂect underlying factors that make the industries react
diﬀerently to other shocks than the MCR reform, which would potentially confound the results. A partic-
ularly worrying observation is that, while none of the other outcomes increase or decrease monotonically
with the treatment intensity group, the mean employment for both entrants (at age three, regardless of
whether one counts only limited companies or all legal forms) and incumbents does. In other words, there
appears to be a high degree of correlation between the treatment intensity measure and average ﬁrm size.
Recalling that the 2006 reform was not a reform of the MCR alone, but a larger overhaul of the law on
limited companies with a stated purpose of easing the life of small business owners, this suggests that
the eﬀects attributed to the lowering of the MCR may be inescapably confounded by other dimension of
the reform that also potentially incentivized small ﬁrm entry.
Another way in which the groups are heterogeneous is their sectoral composition, as illustrated by
ﬁgure 12. G1, i.e. the group with the lowest treatment intensity, is also the one with by far the highest
share of manufacturing industries, whereas G2 and G3 are more service-industry dominant, while the
share of retail and wholesale industries is quite similar across all groups. Intuitively this makes sense:
ﬁrms in manufacturing industries probably require on average higher initial investments than in the
service sector, so that more ﬁrms actually need to invest more than 8 000 euros whether it is required or
not. This clearly poses a problem for the estimation, though, especially considering the macroeconomic
environment of the study period. Namely, the 2008 crisis hit just a few years after the 2006 reform, and
it's not hard to imagine that it might have aﬀected entry into manufacturing industries more than service
industries: the tightening of ﬁnancial markets may have made it harder for potential entrepreneurs to get
the funding necessary to set up a manufacturing business, while many service companies with relatively
small initial costs and hence less need for outside funding would have still been able to enter. Indeed,
a visual inspection of the parallel trends assumption for the main results, discussed in more detail in
the next section, does suggest that this may explain part of the results. To address this concern, I use
three strategies. Firstly, I drop the post-crisis period out of the estimations, leaving only 2007 for the
post-reform period. Next, I exclude manufacturing industries from the estimation (keeping the groups
otherwise the same). Finally, I make use of the fact that the retail and wholesale sector is similarly
represented in all the treatment intensity groups, running the estimations using only those industries.
The results from these robustness checks are reported in appendix A.2. Out of the more interesting results,
the estimates for the number of entrants are robust to the ﬁrst two strategies in the sense that they show
the same pattern of increasing eﬀects with the treatment intensity, though they do drop substantially in
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magnitude. The survival estimates are even quantitatively similar apart from the estimate for the second
group in the ﬁrst strategy. In fact, the survival estimates are not dramatically altered even by the third
strategy, though none of the other results survive dropping all industries apart from retail and wholesale.
Thus it appears that the question of whether or not the 2008 crisis is responsible for the apparent eﬀects
through mechanisms other than the reform is a major one.
Table 2: Summary statistics for various outcomes by treatment intensity group, 1998-2005
Outcome G N Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Number of entrants
(Lim)
1 1026 9.58 5 15.76 4.95 36.81
2 1046 28.16 11 62.57 5.80 43.94
3 1032 10.01 6 13.54 3.55 19.56
Number of entrants
(All)
1 1026 19.96 11 26.86 3.14 14.99
2 1046 87.47 28 167.44 4.89 36.14
3 1032 32.24 15 56.03 5.29 41.69
Share alive at age 3
(Lim)
1 950 0.75 0.79 0.24 -1.09 4.17
2 1023 0.74 0.75 0.19 -0.95 5.26
3 991 0.77 0.80 0.22 -1.08 4.38
Share alive at age 3
(All)
1 1000 0.68 0.67 0.20 -0.38 3.53
2 1040 0.65 0.64 0.14 -0.52 4.22
3 1021 0.66 0.67 0.18 -0.29 3.81
Mean employment
at age 3 (Lim)
1 930 15.18 3.35 44.50 8.82 115.82
2 1007 9.19 2.96 38.74 16.24 353.72
3 975 5.64 2.61 13.46 9.08 114.08
Mean employment
at age 3 (All)
1 930 10.85 2.37 30.89 8.13 97.80
2 1007 6.02 1.78 33.35 23.33 635.17
3 975 3.34 1.63 6.73 7.96 89.67
Cohort employment
at age 3 (Lim)
1 930 98.83 19.65 297.71 9.41 132.25
2 1007 135.66 26.3 419.62 8.08 86.67
3 975 54.61 15.7 138.38 7.10 72.47
Cohort employment
at age 3 (All)
1 930 103.65 23.85 300.33 9.50 135.51
2 1007 159.54 36.30 448.02 7.69 80.06
3 975 80.50 24.3 178.01 5.60 49.62
Number of
incumbents
1 129 252.15 145 273.01 2.58 10.80
2 131 987.51 345 1904.78 3.91 19.67
3 135 342.24 178 540.90 4.69 29.58
Mean employment
of incumbents
1 129 11.28 5.56 15.26 3.01 15.68
2 131 10.17 3.15 44.54 10.42 114.93
3 135 5.31 3.33 5.57 2.17 7.83
Total employment of
incumbents
1 129 2114.41 116.40 2573.44 2.06 7.73
2 131 4027.47 1272.20 6946.09 3.41 16.67
3 135 1237.33 675.50 1637.31 3.89 23.78
Total employment
(Lim)
1 1026 2018.32 875.55 2600.31 1.95 6.69
2 1046 3064.56 941.4 5350.13 3.59 18.49
3 1032 1016.36 550.35 1448.67 4.01 25.70
Total employment
(All)
1 1026 2170.76 1069.05 2700.80 1.93 6.44
2 1046 3779.97 1247.05 6364.84 3.50 17.68
3 1032 1201.69 673.50 1641.03 4.16 27.64
Total ﬁrms (Lim)
1 1027 153.20 92 195.23 3.76 20.83
2 1046 315.02 151.5 580.87 5.41 39.80
3 1031 187.75 99 354.46 6.21 51.14
Total ﬁrms (All)
1 1027 258.73 157 273.95 2.34 8.59
2 1046 653.66 305 1146.12 5.36 41.56
3 1031 623.45 182 1546.47 4.92 28.97
Note: The number of industries in the diﬀerent treatment intensity groups is 130 for G1, 131 for G2
and 135 for G3.
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Sectoral Composition of the Treatment Intensity Groups for the 2006 Reform
All in all, the heterogeneous sectoral composition of the treatment intensity groups combined with
the 2008 crisis as well as the observation of ﬁrm size being correlated with the treatment intensity
measure together with the larger context of the 2006 reform suggest that the main results are most likely
substantially upwards biased. At the same time, though, it is worth keeping in mind that there is almost
certainly downward bias coming from the fact that G1 is also likely to be aﬀected by the reform, and the
eﬀects are potentially further underestimated because the treatment intensity in the included industries
is clearly lower than in the entire set of entrants.
4.2 Results
With the above discussion in mind, this section moves on to presenting the empirical results obtained by
estimating equation (2) for the diﬀerent outcomes of interest. The main results concern the 2006 lowering
of the MCR. The results for the 1997 raising of the requirement are reported separately at the end.
Number of entrants
For the number of entrants, the estimates presented in table 4 show signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients for
both interaction terms, with the number of entrants rising more in the industries with a larger share
of entrants with minimum capital prior to the reform, regardless of whether one deﬁnes the outcome as
including only limited companies or all legal forms. Intuitively, this is not surprising. What is surprising,
though, is the size of the estimated eﬀects.
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Table 4: Treatment eﬀects on the number of entrants
Log number
of entrants
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Limited
only
Post*G2 0.152*** 0.031 0.090 0.213
R2=0.824
N=7 143
Post*G3 0.317*** 0.031 0.256 0.379
All legal
forms
Post*G2 0.082** 0.028 0.027 0.137
R2=0.879
N=7 391
Post*G3 0.242*** 0.028 0.187 0.297
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
With the log-linear heterogeneous treatment intensity speciﬁcation, it's worth carefully pointing out
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients. Recall that the reference category is the third of industries with
lowest shares of minimum capital entrants (G1). For simplicity, suppose an industry is not in the middle
third (G2) of treatment intensity, i.e. G2i = 0 in equation (2), and consider what it means when the
interaction for the highest third of treatment intensity (G3) and the post-period changes from zero to
one. Let Y 0it correspond to the situation where G
3
i = 0 or postt = 0 or both so that G
3
i ∗ postt = 0 and
Y 1it to the situation where G
3
i ∗ postt = 1. With the outcome in logarithms, the deterministic parts under
the diﬀerent situations can then be written as
lnY 0it = α+ λt + µi
lnY 1it = α+ λt + µi + β3 (3)
=⇒ ∆lnYit = lnY 1it − lnY 0it = β3
Hence, the coeﬃcient for the interaction of the indicators for the post-period and G3 is the diﬀerence
between logarithms in the two situations, i.e. the part of any change attributable to either being in G3
instead of G1 in the post period, or being in the post-period instead of the pre-period when the industry
belongs to G3 (with year- and industry ﬁxed eﬀects staying the same). Note that while the former
interpretation is explicitly relative to G1, the latter interpretation also relies on the implicit assumption
that G1 is unaﬀected: if the outcome changes in G1 industries as a result of the reform, the estimated
coeﬃcient is biased towards zero, so the true change when moving from pre to post when one belongs to
G3 is likely larger.
Finally, note that
∆lnYit = lnY
1
it − lnY 0it = ln
Y 1it
Y 0it
=⇒ Y
1
it
Y 0it
= eβ3 (4)
=⇒ ∆%Yit = Y
1
it − Y 0it
Y 0it
= eβ3 − 1
so that one gets an approximate23 percentage change by taking the exponential of the estimated coeﬃcient
and subtracting one.24 Thus - holding the assumption that G1 is unaﬀected - lowering the MCR causes
approximately a 16% rise in the number of entrants in G2 industries, and a 37% increase in G3 industries
23Approximate because any bias arising from the error term is ignored
24For small enough β3, it holds that β3 ≈ eβ3 − 1. E.g. β3 = 0.100 =⇒ eβ3 − 1 ≈ 0.105. However, β3 = 0.300 =⇒
eβ3 − 1 ≈ 0.350. The latter is already quite a signiﬁcant diﬀerence considering the scale we're dealing with here. Hence
equation (4) will be used to obtain the percentage approximations.
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when only limited companies are counted into the outcome. As the average number of limited entrants in
the pre-reform period in G2 industries is 28 and in G3 industries 10, and there are 131 G2 industries and
135 G3 industries, this implies the yearly creation of roughly 0.16*28*131 ≈ 587 new limited companies
in G2 industries and 0.37*10*135 ≈ 500 in G3 industries. In total then, the estimates imply a yearly
average of about 1 087 limited companies created due to the reform. As there were around 94 000
limited companies in the data in 2005, this is a big eﬀect, especially considering that it assumes G1 to
be unaﬀected.
The reliability of the estimates of course critically hinges on whether or not one believes the parallel
trends assumption to hold. To visually inspect its plausibility, I ﬁrst regress the outcome of interest on the
interaction of the entry year and the treatment intensity group, controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects of individual
industries, and then plot the marginal eﬀects of the individual years (with 1998 serving as the reference
year) evaluated separately for each treatment intensity group. With perfectly parallel trends, one would
expect to see no diﬀerences between the eﬀects of individual years for the diﬀerent treatment intensity
groups in the pre-reform period - the lines in the plot should overlap up to the reform, and disperse after
that if there is an eﬀect.
Figure 13a shows the plot for the number of entrants when only limited companies are included in
the outcome. One observes that the marginal eﬀects in the diﬀerent treatment intensity groups in the
pre-reform period are quite close together, all having overlapping 95% conﬁdence intervals for the entire
period, though the point estimates for G3 are in almost every period slightly higher than for G2 and
G1, which overlap almost perfectly. Immediately after the reform, the 2007 marginal eﬀect is the highest
so far for all the groups, suggesting some eﬀect from the reform even for G1, though the increase from
2006 is sharper for G2 and G3. After that, the diﬀerences start to clearly get wider, for G3 so much so
that its conﬁdence interval never again crosses that of G1 and rarely that of G2 after 2008. This pattern
of closeness in the pre-reform period and dispersion in the post-reform period in the marginal eﬀects
of individual years across the treatment intensity groups is precisely what one would expect to observe
if indeed G2 and G3 are more aﬀected than G1. However, the unbiasedness of the estimates is called
into question by the timing with which the dispersion happens. Notably, while the increase immediately
after the reform is somewhat sharper in G2 and G3, the diﬀerences get much larger only after 2008,
corresponding of course with the ﬁnancial crisis.
Recall that the identifying assumption requires that, absent the reform, the development of the out-
come would not have been systematically related to the treatment intensity measure. Thus, if we suspect
that the crisis plays a role in the dispersion observed after 2008, the critical question becomes whether it
happens because the lowering of entry costs has made the entry numbers in G2 and G3 more resilient to
the crisis than in the less aﬀected G1, or because of some other diﬀerences in the types of industries that
comprise the groups. Relatedly, one can ask whether the amount of dispersion that is observed would
have happened without the 2008 crisis. This is important for the external validity of the results obtained:
even if the reform is the cause in the sense that it makes the entry numbers in G2 and G3 industries
more resilient to the crisis than in G3, the resulting estimates may give too rosy a picture of what one
can achieve by lowering entry costs in normal times. This would not mean that the results are biased in
the sense that they underestimate the creation of ﬁrms that would have happened in the counterfactual
case of no reform, but it would make it less likely that, for instance, policy makers in other countries
could expect quantitatively similar results by implementing the same reform today.
As previously discussed, G1 may have been more aﬀected by the crisis simply due to its large share of
manufacturing industries. Dropping the post-crisis years from the estimation or excluding manufacturing
industries yield substantially lower estimates (though the pattern of increased eﬀect with rising treatment
intensity remains), while the estimates are not at all robust to including only retail and wholesale indus-
tries (see appendix A.2). This suggests that much of the eﬀect is indeed explained by the 2008 crisis
and probably due to characteristics other than the treatment intensity. Still, a signiﬁcant eﬀect remains
with the post-reform period consisting only of 2007, a result that is not surprising in light of ﬁgure 13a.
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Adding all legal forms to the outcome, the estimates are somewhat diﬀerent. The increase in G2
industries drops to around 9% and in G3 industries to around 27%. With all legal forms counted, the
number of entrants in the pre-reform period is on average 87 in G2 and 32 in G3 industries, which with
a similar rough calculation as in the case of limited companies translates to a total of around 1 026 new
ﬁrms per year in G2 and 1 166 in G3 industries. If there was major substitution between the legal forms,
one would expect the absolute number of yearly created new ﬁrms attributable to the reform to be smaller
when counting all legal forms to the outcome, because the reform should not encourage the entry of new
non-limited companies, while some of the new limited companies would have been set up as non-limited
companies if the reform didn't happen.
It is surprising then that the estimates together with the sizes of the industries imply a clearly higher
number of new entrants when all legal forms are counted. However, the parallel trends assumption is
quite suspect when all legal forms are included in the number of entrants, as can be seen from ﬁgure
13b. If, as it appears, G2 and G3 are already on an upward trend before the reform while G1 is not,
the estimates will overstate the number of new entrants attributable to the reform, so that the role of
substitution is hidden.
Another potential confounding factor is if substitution happens to a greater extent in the G1 industries.
If that is the case, the eﬀect on them with all legal forms counted will be relatively smaller, increasing
the diﬀerence between them and the industries in the other groups. Some entrepreneurs may also set
up non-limited companies initially, even if they are encouraged by the eased possibility of setting up a
limited company later down the line. Finally, and most speculatively, there may be some kind of herding
eﬀects at play, where founders of non-limited companies are encouraged to enter industries after an initial
rush by non-limited companies, as they perceive these industries to be attractive since so many others
are entering them. Whatever the reason, the estimates in the all-legal-forms-case largely fail to satisfy
their purpose, leaving one uncertain over whether the increases observed for limited companies are mostly
companies that would have been set up using some other legal form in absence of the reform.
Survival of entrants
The survival of entrants can be seen as an aspect of their quality, drawing from the entrepreneurial
ability of their managers as discussed in section 3. Recall that the theoretical prediction for the eﬀects of
lowering entry costs depends largely on whether the managers themselves are aware of that ability - with
informed managers there is a trade-oﬀ between the quantity and average quality of managers, while with
uninformed managers entry costs are simply barriers to trial and error, so that the average quality should
not be aﬀected, though increased competition might still decrease survival. The estimates presented in
table 5 indeed show a slight negative eﬀect on the share of a cohort alive at age three with the eﬀect
importantly more negative for G3 than G2 industries, though the estimates are quite small.
Table 5: Treatment eﬀects on the survival of entrants
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Limited
only
Post*G2 -0.008 0.013 -0.033 0.017
R2=0.178
N=6 016
Post*G3 -0.029* 0.013 -0.054 -0.003
All legal
forms
Post*G2 -0.003 0.010 -0.022 0.016
R2=0.279
N=6 231
Post*G3 -0.031** 0.010 -0.050 -0.012
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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As the outcome here is in percentages rather than logarithms the estimate gives the diﬀerence in
percentage points. With only limited companies included, then, the share alive at three years drops by
0.8 percentage points more in G2 industries and 2.9 percentage points more in G3 industries than in G1
industries. As the pre-reform average 3-year survival in G2 industries is 0.74 and in G3 industries 0.77,
the reform drops the survival in G2 to around 0.73 and in G3 to around 0.74. The relative drop for G2
industries is approximately 1.1% and for G3 industries 3.8%. Once again, it is worth pointing out that
these numbers are biased towards zero if there is a change to the same direction but a lesser extent in
G1 industries.
With all ﬁrms included, the estimate for G2 drops even closer to zero, while the estimate for G3 changes
very little. However, the pre-reform averages are clearly lower when all companies are considered, which
is not surprising recalling the discussion on ﬁgure 9. Hence, while for the near-zero G2 the relative change
is still smaller in the all companies -case, for G3 it is in fact larger. This may hint that something about
the protection of limited liability is inherently good for the survival of companies: as more founders set up
a limited company after the reform, the average survival probabilities among all companies rise relatively
more than among only limited companies simply due to the fact that a higher fraction of entrants is now
limited companies, which are on average more likely to survive to age three.
A visual inspection of the parallel trends assumption for survival (see ﬁgure 14) suggests that the
estimates for G3 may in fact be biased towards zero. Regardless of whether one includes only limited
companies or all legal forms, the marginal eﬀects of years are consistently higher for G3 than the other
groups prior to the reform, but afterward the dispersion actually becomes smaller. If G3 is on an upward
trend prior to the reform and G1 isn't, the counterfactual trend that estimation for G3 is based on will
be closer to the realized trend than the actual trend would have been, absent the reform.
Growth of surviving entrants
The other aspects of the quality of entrants are their size and post-entry growth. Since these two are
to some extent necessarily indistinguishable from each other in the yearly data (size at age 0 already
includes whatever growth happened up to the point at which it was measured), I group them together
and estimate the eﬀects of the reform on the (logarithm of the) mean size (in terms of employment) of
entrants at age three. Note that there are several reasons why one industry might have a higher mean
size of three-year old ﬁrms than another: the ﬁrms might already enter larger or grow faster, but it may
also be the result of the smallest or non-growing entrants in an industry exiting faster as the ﬁrms that
exit before age 3 are not counted in the denominator.
Table 6: Treatment eﬀects on the growth of surviving entrants
Log mean emp.
at age 3
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Limited
only
Post*G2 0.048 0.061 -0.072 0.168
R2=0.392
N=5 910
Post*G3 0.029 0.061 -0.091 0.149
All legal
forms
Post*G2 0.030 0.056 -0.080 0.140
R2=0.462
N=6 210
Post*G3 -0.022 0.056 -0.132 0.087
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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The theoretical predictions for the size and growth of entrants again depend on the extent to which
the founders are informed of their abilities. The fact that the estimates in table 6 are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero, and not monotonically increasing or decreasing with the treatment intensity measure,
gives credence to the view that entrepreneurs may not be very well informed of their abilities before they
enter the market. Note that the estimates on the survival on the other hand were consistent with the
view of informed entrepreneurs. One explanation for this discrepancy might be the distinction between
subsistence and transformational entrepreneurs: for the former, maximizing survival rather than growth
might be the objective, so that in a world of informed subsistence entrepreneurs, one would indeed
expect the new entrants to be less able to achieve that objective, while growth would remain unaﬀected.
Another interpretation is that the slight drop in survival is simply driven by increased competition, and
once uncompetitive ﬁrms are selected out, the growth of the survivors is not aﬀected. However, it is also
important to stress that the estimates for growth are very imprecise, so that absence of evidence for an
eﬀect does not necessarily translate to evidence of absence.
To get a sense of the scale of the estimated coeﬃcients, note that as the outcome is again in logarithms,
the interpretation is similar to the number-of-entrants-case. When only limited companies are included,
the average size of entrants at age 3 in the pre-reform period is 9.19 for G2 and 5.64 for G3. Using
equation (4), one gets an approximate percentage change of 4.9% for G2 and 2.9% for G3 industries.
Thus, according to the estimations, the average ﬁrm in G2 employs about 0.049 ∗ 9.19 ≈ 0.45 and in
G3 about 0.029 ∗ 5.64 ≈ 0.16 more people at age three due to the reform, again assuming that G1 is
not aﬀected and the parallel trends assumption holds. The picture does not change much when all legal
forms are included, though now the estimate for G3 turns negative, which is what one would expect
for informed entrepreneurs with an objective to grow. However, both estimates are now even closer to
zero than in the only-limited-companies-case, and since the pre-reform averages are also smaller when all
companies are included, this implies smaller absolute changes in the average employment of entrants at
age 3.
Hence the estimated changes in the average employment of ﬁrms are quite small. Since the estimates
are mostly slightly positive but statistically not diﬀerent from zero, and the theoretical mechanisms
suggest that, if anything, the eﬀect should be negative, one can with some conﬁdence say that the reform
appears to have no eﬀect on the growth of surviving entrants. Figure 15 gives some support for the view
that there is no eﬀect from the reform. When only limited companies are included, the point estimates
for the yearly marginal eﬀects are in most cases the smaller for G1 than G2 and G3 both before and after
the reform, but for all years the estimates for all groups are close to zero (though very imprecise) and
there is no clear change in pattern when the reform happens. When all legal forms are included, there
are even less discernible patterns, as the estimates for G1 are no longer consistently smaller than for the
other groups. All in all there seems to be no eﬀect, though the estimates are too imprecise to be certain.
Total contribution of entrants
Having estimated the eﬀects on the number, growth and survival of entrants, one can use them to
calculate the eﬀect on the total contribution of entrants - speciﬁcally by the deﬁnitions used here, the
net job creation of entrants by age three. However, one can also directly estimate this from the data
by comparing the sum of employment by three-year-old ﬁrms that enter before or after the reform. The
estimates in 7 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in table 4, which could be expected
considering the near-zero eﬀects reported in tables 5 and 6. Figure 16, presenting the visual inspection of
parallel trends, also provides no surprises in light of what has already been discussed: the general pattern
is similar to the number-of-entrants-case, though with more noise coming from the survival and growth
components, and the assumption seems more plausible when only limited companies are included.
Recall from the calculations in the previous sections that, if one only considers limited companies,
the estimates imply the yearly creation of roughly 587 new ﬁrms in G2 attributable to the reform, with
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ﬁrms surviving to age with probability 0.73, and growing to an average size of 1.049 ∗ 9.19 ≈ 9.64 if they
manage to survive. For G3 industries meanwhile, there are around 500 new ﬁrms with a three-year survival
probability of 0.74 and an average size of 1.029∗5.64 ≈ 5.80 upon survival. Hence, the reform would have
resulted in around 587 ∗ 0.73 ∗ 9.64 ≈ 4130 more jobs in G2 industries and 500 ∗ 0.74 ∗ 5.80 ≈ 2146 in G3
industries every year from 2010 (the year that the ﬁrst post-reform cohort turns three) onwards. From
the direct estimation, using equation (4), one obtains approximate growth rates in the total employment
of three-year-old ﬁrms of 17% for G2 and 34% for G3 industries. With pre-reform averages of 135.66
and 54.61 respectively, this then implies around 131 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 135.66 ≈ 3021 new jobs per year in G2 and
135∗0.34∗54.61 ≈ 2507 in G3 industries attributable to the reform. Hence the direct estimation implies a
lot less jobs created in G2 industries and somewhat more in G3 industries than the indirect calculations.
Since the eﬀects on survival and growth were statistically speaking quite insigniﬁcant, one may also
want to check what happens if they are just assumed to be zero. In that case, one obtains the number
of jobs created simply by multiplying the number of ﬁrms created with the original survival probability
and size at age three. This sort of calculation would in turn yield 587∗9.19∗0.74 ≈ 3992 yearly new jobs
in G2 and 500 ∗ 0.77 ∗ 5.64 ≈ 2171 in G3 industries. These then fall in between the direct and indirect
calculations, though much closer to the latter, which is not surprising as the changes in the survival and
growth were indeed not large.
It then appears that the changes in the number of entrants are the main component driving changes
in the total contribution of entrants, as the changes in survival and growth rates are way less striking, and
the direct estimation yields numbers in the same ballpark. Recalling the empirical context that most ﬁrms
are small and exhibit little to no growth, it is likely that the job creation among new ﬁrms attributable
to the reform is the result of a lot of small business founders setting up companies that provide a job for
themselves and perhaps some members of their families, rather than a surge in the number of ambitious
startups that end up employing a lot of people. The critical question in terms of total employment eﬀects
then becomes whether these new founders were previously employed or unemployed. Another missing
piece of the picture is what happens to the employment of the ﬁrms that are already in the market when
the reform happens. To try to shed some light on these questions, the next step would be to evaluate
what happens to the incumbents and total employment in industries with diﬀerent treatment intensities.
In practice, though, it turns out that these estimates add very little information.
Table 7: Treatment eﬀects on the employment contribution of entering cohorts
Log total cohort
emp. at age 3
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Limited
only
Post*G2 0.159* 0.073 0.015 0.303
R2=0.601
N=5 910
Post*G3 0.290*** 0.073 0.146 0.434
All legal
forms
Post*G2 0.089 0.067 -0.041 0.220
R2=0.646
N=6 210
Post*G3 0.168* 0.066 0.038 0.297
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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Eﬀects on incumbents
When it comes to the incumbents, the theoretical discussion predicts quite unambiguously that lower-
ing entry barriers should decrease their survival probability, while their growth and total employment
contribution could go either way depending on the relative strengths of the underlying mechanisms. To
estimate the eﬀects on incumbents, I take the cross section of ﬁrms that is in existence in the immediate
pre-reform period, i.e. in 2005. Note that since substitution should play no role as no new incumbents
can be set up, all estimates include all legal forms.
I ﬁrst estimate the diﬀerence in the (logarithm of) the number of incumbents. Note that by deﬁnition
this number can only decrease over time as no new incumbents can be set up. What one would expect
based on the theory is that the number would decrease more in G2 industries than in G1, and even
more in G3. The ﬁrst part of that prediction is indeed borne out by the estimates in table 8. However,
while the eﬀect on G3 industries also seems to be negative (though insigniﬁcant), it is less so than for G2
industries. This suggests that something else than the reform is driving the estimates.
The average size of the incumbents, meanwhile, does follow a monotonic pattern from one treatment
intensity group to another. Interestingly, the eﬀect appears to be positive, suggesting that incumbents in
industries with more new competition grow faster than those in industries with less of an increase in new
entrants. Note that the growth of the average here is not necessarily the result of growth of individual
ﬁrms: it could just mean that less successful incumbents are screened out by the new competition,
as would happen in the Hopenhayn-framework if the selection eﬀect dominated over the price eﬀect.
However, this interpretation is somewhat at odds with the observation from the number of industries
that selection does not seem to happen systematically more in industries with higher treatment intensity.
The estimates for the sum of incumbent sizes, i.e. their total employment contribution, also reveal no
systematic pattern with respect to treatment intensity, with G2 being apparently negatively aﬀected and
G3 signiﬁcantly positively aﬀected.
All in all, the estimates in table 8 do not tell us much about the eﬀects the MCR reform has on ﬁrms
already in the market. This is likely due to the factors already mentioned: having to do the estimation
utilizing only one cohort of ﬁrms leads both to less observations and the lack of ability to control for
year-eﬀects, and the fact that incumbents are on average larger combined with the less direct causal chain
may make confounding factors more of a problem than they were for entrants, hiding any potential signal
under layers of noise. Although the pattern of the estimates for the size of incumbents does make sense
in light of the Hopenhayn-framework, considering the context of the estimates for the number and total
contribution, one should probably not take them too seriously either.
Visual inspection of the parallel trends assumption, presented in ﬁgures 17-19, supports the view that
the incumbent-estimates should be given very little weight. Note that he pre-reform period now only
includes 2005 and 2006, so that there is only one point at which the diﬀerence in marginal year eﬀects can
be inspected before the reform happens (2005 being now the reference year).For the number of incumbents,
one observes that there is very little diﬀerence between the marginal eﬀects of 2006, followed by a steadily
increasing dispersion in the post-period. This is precisely what one would expect if the reform had an
eﬀect on the incumbents via yearly increasing competition, were it not for the fact that G2 is the group
consistently below the others, which suggests something else than the eﬀects of the reform is at play.
For the average size of incumbents on the other hand, one observes an almost monotonic ordering in the
post-period - though G1 catches up to G2 in 2015 - but G3 seems to be a bit above the others already
in 2006. Finally, for the total employment of incumbents, one again unsurprisingly observes something
that shares elements from the two factors that make it up. In sum, for the incumbent outcomes, the
2006 marginal eﬀects are close enough to each other to suggest that parallel trends may hold, but after
the reform the marginal eﬀects are not systematically monotonically increasing or decreasing with the
treatment intensity. Hence, making causal interpretations in the case of the estimates obtained for the
incumbents is highly suspect.
50
Table 8: Treatment eﬀects on incumbent outcomes
Outcome Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Log number
of incumbents
Post*G2 -0.063*** 0.011 -0.086 -0.041
R2=0.989
N=5 148
Post*G3 -0.019 0.011 -0.041 0.003
Log mean
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2 0.044* 0.020 0.004 0.084
R2=0.964
N=5 148
Post*G3 0.108*** 0.020 0.069 0.148
Log total
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2 -0.019 0.022 -0.063 0.242
R2=0.973
N=5 148
Post*G3 0.089*** 0.022 0.046 0.133
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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Total employment eﬀects
While the entrant estimates suggest a substantially positive result from the reform, the ambiguous re-
sults for incumbents leave the total eﬀect inconclusive. However, one can also try to estimate the total
employment eﬀects directly using the (logarithm of the) total employment of an industry as the outcome
variable. Doing so yields the estimates presented in table 9, which suggest an overwhelmingly positive
overall employment eﬀect that makes sense in terms of the pattern of eﬀects increasing with the treatment
intensity.
Inspecting ﬁgure 20 makes it clear, though, that the parallel trends assumption is very suspect for the
direct estimation of total employment eﬀects. While dispersion again increases post-reform, there is quite
a clear gap opening up between G1 and the other groups already in the pre-reform period. Also, while
G2 and G3 do overlap to a plausible extent with each other in the pre-period, even diﬀerences between
them might be biased as their diﬀerence gets consistently smaller in the pre-period with G3 overtaking
G2 in 2006 and never falling below it again. The story is the same regardless of whether one includes
only limited companies or all legal forms in the outcome.
Thus, it seems that whether one tries to estimate the total employment eﬀects of the 2006 MCR reform
directly or indirectly, the results are quite unreliable. Parallel trends seems like a plausible assumption
for the individual components of the contribution of entrants, as well as the direct estimation of the
total contribution of entrants, but the results obtained for incumbents are likely to reﬂect some other
forces than the reform. Meanwhile, total employment in G2 and G3 industries also appears to be on an
upward trend already before the reform. Hence, the best approximation for the total employment eﬀects
of the reform may be just the total contribution of entrants. It is very well possible that the increased
competition from the entrants is in the end insigniﬁcant for the incumbents, and that their performance
is driven by some unrelated factors that also lead the total employment trends of the diﬀerent industries
to diverge already before the reform.
Table 9: Treatment eﬀects on total employment
Log total
employment
Regressor Coeﬃcient Std. err.
95% Conﬁdence interval
Lower bound Higher bound
Limited
only
Post*G2 0.112*** 0.022 0.069 0.155
R2=0.936
N=7 453
Post*G3 0.306*** 0.022 0.263 0.348
All legal
forms
Post*G2 0.107*** 0.019 0.069 0.145
R2=0.939
N=7 467
Post*G3 0.274*** 0.019 0.236 0.312
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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Figure 20
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The 1997 reform
If the 2006 lowering of the MCR was behind the estimated eﬀects obtained in the previous section,
one would expect to ﬁnd qualitatively opposite results when estimating the eﬀects of the 1997 raising
of the same requirement. Inspecting table 10 reveals that this not quite the case. For the number of
entrants with only limited companies included, it is encouraging that the estimated coeﬃcients for both
interactions are negative, but what is less encouraging is that the estimate for G3 is less negative than for
G2, and neither is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level. When all legal forms are
added to the picture, the coeﬃcients turn positive, and quite signiﬁcantly so for G3. As for the rest of
the estimates, there are only two other coeﬃcients that are statistically diﬀerent from zero, and with this
many outcomes it is entirely possible to obtain some false positives25 even when dealing with setups
closer to the ideal of randomized experiments. Hence the overall message of table 10 seems to be that
the 1997 reform had no eﬀect on the dynamics of ﬁrms.
Table 10: Estimates for the 1997 reform
Outcome Included N R2
Coeﬃcient
(Std. err.)
Post*G2 Post*G3
Log number
of entrants
Limited
only
1 917 0.833 -0.088
(0.047)
-0.010
(0.047)
All legal
forms
1 917 0.889 0.012
(0.044)
0.259***
(0.044)
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Limited
only
1 917 0.480 0.000
(0.013)
0.005
(0.013)
All legal
forms
1 917 0.551 -0.011
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
Log mean
employment at age 3
Limited
only
1 962 0.477 0.011
(0.081)
-0.053
(0.081)
All legal
forms
1 963 0.525 -0.033
(0.075)
-0.172*
(0.075)
Log total cohort
employment at age 3
Limited
only
1 962 0.636 -0.112
(0.096)
-0.057
(0.096)
All legal
forms
1 963 0.679 -0.091
(0.086)
0.068
(0.086)
Log number
of incumbents
All legal
forms
1 405 0.971 -0.065*
(0.028)
-0.022
(0.028)
Log mean employment
of incumbents
All legal
forms
1 405 0.924 -0.028
(0.040)
0.048
(0.040)
Log total employment
of incumbents
All legal
forms
1 405 0.936 -0.092
(0.048)
0.026
(0.048)
Log total
employment
Limited
only
1 917 0.902 -0.074
(0.042)
0.021
(0.042)
All legal
forms
1 919 0.878 -0.029
(0.046)
0.050
(0.046)
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
There are several reasons why the estimates for the 1997 reform might remain insigniﬁcant, while
the estimates for the 2006 reform appear to show eﬀects for some outcomes. Firstly, since the treatment
intensity measure in this case is constructed in an indirect matter, it may include much more measurement
error than the original intensity measure used in the case of the 2006 reform. This can lead to downward
bias in the estimates: if a lot of industries are for instance erroneously placed into G3 when they would
actually belong to G1 and vice versa, any potential eﬀect will be diminished in the estimates as G1 reacts
stronger and G3 weaker than they in reality should.
25In the sense of not being statistical zeros, though both are actually negative in this case.
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Another potential reason has to do with the inherent complex nature of markets, where causes condi-
tion other causes and the same cause in one circumstance has a diﬀerent eﬀect than in another. One such
multi-causal mechanism that might be at play was already discussed in the context of ﬁgure 13a, where
we observed that a lot of the dispersion in entry numbers after the 2006 reform happened only after 2008
and hence the ﬁnancial crisis. The crisis seems to have hit G1 the hardest, but one can't conclusively
say whether this was because the reform had made the other groups more resilient, or because of some
unrelated factors (though the heterogeneous characteristics of the treatment intensity groups strongly
suggests that the latter interpretation is likely). In the case of the 1997 reform, it's possible that, for
instance, the other costs of setting up a business back then were so high that the increase of the MCR -
though in the same ballpark nominally as the decrease in 2006 - was relatively not large enough to dis-
courage people who already were committed to setting up businesses. This could be the case for example
if we believe that the spread of information technology among households after the turn of millennia has
made it less costly to set up a business. One could also speculate about a psychological explanation:
an increase in cost may not defer potentially overconﬁdent entrepreneurs as much as a decrease in cost
encourages experimentation.
Finally, there are two possibilities that call into question the validity of the interpretations made here.
For one, it might of course be that the 2006 estimates are entirely erroneous. As mentioned, if 2008
hit G1 the most because of some other factors than the reform, the estimates in table 4 may be highly
inﬂated, even if a qualitatively an eﬀect might exist regardless. The fact that G1 clearly has a higher
share of manufacturing industries while G2 and G3 are more dominated by the service sector does make
this very much a possibility. However, parallel trends for the number of entrants seem to hold quite well
prior to the reform, suggesting that the groups react at least to smaller shocks similarly when the MCR is
high. Furthermore, even if one ignores the post-crisis years or excludes manufacturing companies, some
eﬀect remains.
The other possibility is that the estimates reﬂect some other dimensions of the 2006 reform. Recall
that the 1997 and 2006 MCR reforms were both parts of larger reforms of the law on limited companies.
Of course, the treatment intensity measure used here is designed to speciﬁcally pick up diﬀerences in the
importance of the MCR, but judging by the characteristics of the diﬀerent groups constructed using it,
it is not the only thing systematically diﬀerent between the groups. Out of the characteristics that were
considered, only the average size of entrants at age 3 and the average size of incumbents monotonically
increase with the treatment intensity - G3 has the smallest ﬁrms and G1 the largest (though in the case
of incumbents the diﬀerence between G2 and G3 is not large). However, since the 2006 reform was indeed
statedly pro small business, it is also a very real possibility that some other dimension of the reform is
responsible for at least part of the eﬀects estimated in the previous section.
Inspecting the parallel trends ﬁgures (presented for the 1997 reform in appendix C) suggests that, at
least for the number of entrants when only limited companies are included, measurement error does seem
to play a role. Indeed, there is more dispersion between the groups before the reform than after it, but
after 1997 the marginal eﬀects are consistently lower for all groups, hinting that an eﬀect may be present
but the diﬀerent treatment intensities are not suﬃciently captured by the indirect measure. Similarly,
survival appears to increase for all groups after the reform. Meanwhile, in contrast to the 2006 reform,
the assumption seems to fail clearly for entrant growth and total contribution, with G3 experiencing
consistently higher year-eﬀects than the other groups. Finally, the incumbent outcomes exhibit similar
problems as in the 2006, and the total employment outcome also fails the parallel trends test, though
the manner in which the latter fails is somewhat diﬀerent than in the 2006 case: the dispersion between
the groups stays quite constant for the entire period, except for G2 which drops suddenly two years after
the reform. All in all, the ﬁgures reinforce the need to access the direct treatment intensity measure
for the pre-1997 period to conclude how much of the apparent contradiction between the results for the
1997 and 2006 reforms can be explained by measurement error. The necessary data, while not currently
readily available, probably does exist. This is hopefully something that future research can address.
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5 Lessons Learned and Open Questions
As of July 1st, 2019, the minimum capital requirement is a thing of the past in Finland, at least for
now. In light of the evidence presented in this thesis, one might expect to see a signiﬁcant increase in
limited incorporation following this latest reform, and indeed, according to YLE news, a thousand new
limited companies - roughly the same amount that the main estimates here imply as the yearly increase
following the 2006 reform - were founded in just 11 days following the removal (Muilu, 2019). This might
be interpreted as evidence of a non-linear eﬀect from removing the barrier entirely as opposed to just
lowering it, though in nominal terms the drop from 2 500 euros to zero was actually smaller than the
decrease from 8 000 to 2 5000 euros. However, one should keep in mind that the estimates in this thesis
may not have reﬂected such an increase even if it happened in 2006 as well, for several reasons.
Firstly, the Statistics Finland data used imposes a relatively low, but still substantial, threshold for
ﬁrms to be included in the panel, namely that they are employers or cross a minimum turnover limit of
around 8 000 - 10 000 euros (the minimum is diﬀerent every year). This means that very small companies
- for instance companies set up for purposes of running a part-time business on the side of a main source
of income - may not be counted. While ﬁrms of this size are too small to have much economic impact
alone, it is possible that their mass is still signiﬁcant enough to not be ignored. This is due to the highly
skewed nature of the ﬁrm size distribution.
The concept of the long tail popularized by Anderson (2006) in the context of niche oﬀerings provides
some useful insights here. His argument in a nutshell is that in many markets there are a few hits -
products or services that are widely known and have a big impact on their own - but that the wide
variety of niches behind the hits with small but dedicated followings put together is worth at least as
much (both economically and especially culturally speaking). The connection to micro business is obvious
- consider for instance a neighborhood thrift store run as a hobby by a single person with low turnover
and no intentions of growing. It's measurable economic impact alone might be practically non-existent,
but the non-pecuniary beneﬁts derived from it by the owner and even their customers may in fact be
signiﬁcant. Furthermore, it might be, as Axtell (2001) ﬁnds using data covering the entire set of tax-
paying U.S. ﬁrms, that ﬁrm size follows a power law distribution, which would imply that the tail of the
distribution censored by the thresholds in the data is very long indeed, and the combined contribution
of these ﬁrms even in monetary terms becomes something worth considering. Without access to more
comprehensive data, the impact of this tail remains a mystery.
Secondly, the industry size threshold adopted in order to avoid measurement error in treatment
intensity means that neither the estimates or the illustrative calculations based on them are based on the
entire set of industries. In the case of the latter, this leads mechanistically to lower numbers. Furthermore,
the average pre-reform share of limited company entrants with minimum capital is substantially lower
in the included industries than in the set of all ﬁrms in Finland, suggesting that a lot of aﬀected ﬁrms
do indeed go unnoticed due to excluding small industries. However, because of the measurement error
stemming from industry smallness, it is hard to say which of the excluded industries are truly more
aﬀected and which are not.
Finally, as stressed throughout the previous section, no industries are probably entirely unaﬀected
by the reform, implying almost certain downward bias in the estimates resulting from the eﬀect on the
control group. What this means is that the proper interpretation of the estimates is relative to the least
aﬀected third of industries. Note that the illustrative calculations that yield the thousand ﬁrms a year
-ﬁgure assume no eﬀect on the control group, so they should be taken as rough approximations of the
absolute eﬀect only if one believes that the least aﬀected industries are aﬀected to a negligible extent.
Still, it might also be that the removal of the MCR does in reality have very diﬀerent eﬀects on some
margins than the lowering. This ties into the fact that, while the purpose of this thesis has been to use
the MCR as a case study of the relationship between entry barriers and ﬁrm dynamics, a full cost-beneﬁt
analysis of reforms in the regulation would have to take into account other potential consequences.
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For instance, the tax administration has raised concerns that the removal of the MCR may make life
easier for those operating on the illicit side of the economy, for example by making the setup of front
companies easier (Muilu, 2019). Indeed, in the government proposal for the 2019 removal (Parliament
Of Finland, 2018), it is mentioned that the out of all the stakeholders that were asked to comment on
the proposal, only the black market investigation unit of the tax administration (harmaan talouden
selvitysyksikkö in Finnish) explicitly objected it. Another unintended consequence of easing limited
incorporation is that employees may ﬁnd it more tempting to formally become independent contractors
selling services to their employer in order to seek lower tax rates, and the employer may have an incentive
to encourage this due to a lighter regulative burden in sub-contracting versus employing individuals.
One might expect that, if these phenomena were a major problem, the estimates for the 2006 reform
would reﬂect that as fronts for illicit operators and employees masquerading as contractors are likely to
employ less people, and the former also probably survive for shorter periods of time. However, it might
also be that even the modest MCR of 2 500 euros was suﬃcient to deter such behaviour to a large extent,
and the removal will open the ﬂoodgates. In this light, the above-mentioned surge of a thousand new
limited companies in the eleven days following the removal appears less encouraging.
Thus, it should be emphasized that one needs to be cautious in interpreting the evidence presented
here as endorsement of the removal of barriers such as the MCR. What I do believe the evidence manages
to establish are two things:
1. The 2006 lowering of the MCR did cause an increase in the number of limited company entrants.
2. Quantifying the increase and its broader impact is highly uncertain, perhaps inherently, but at least
with the data and methodology used in this study.
Note that the ﬁrst point is speciﬁc to the 2006 reform. Though the lack of important data for the 1997-
period likely plays a role in the fact that no evidence is found of any eﬀects for the 1997 reform, that fact
still leaves a big question mark over the external validity of the results when it comes to implementing
MCR reforms. Macroeconomic conditions may amplify or diminish the eﬀects of such reforms in many
ways.
For instance, the model of Clementi and Palazzo (2016) suggests that entry itself acts a feedback
mechanism: negative shocks lead to less entry which makes the recovery from the shocks more sluggish.
The authors argue that this is a major reason for the slow recovery from the 2008 crisis, and it can
also help explain the large estimated eﬀects of the 2006 reform even in absence of bias arising from the
fact that the industries with the lowest treatment intensities are disproportionately in the manufacturing
sector. To see why, note that the positive estimates do not necessarily imply an absolute increase in the
number of entrants, simply that the number of entrants was higher than it would have been without the
reform. Thus, if the reform did not happen, the 2008 crisis might have diminished entry numbers even
more, especially in the industries where the MCR was a relatively more important obstacle, and those
diminished entry numbers would have persisted longer due to them propagating the negative shock.
Practically speaking, it might be that the entry numbers in manufacturing industries suﬀered more
as a result of the 2008 crisis because the lowering of the MCR did not eﬀectively lower the entry costs of
ﬁrms in those industries as they needed high initial investments in any case. By contrast, entry numbers
in service industries suﬀered less because the ﬁrms in those industries had less entry costs, but they would
also have suﬀered more if the high MCR was still in place as then the ﬁrms would have needed to ﬁnd
the funding for that initial capital.
Another mechanism that might explain the lack of eﬀect in 1997 is that the other costs of setting
up a business back then might have been so high that the higher MCR carried less weight. It's easy
to imagine, for example, that the spread of the personal computer had made running a small business
signiﬁcantly more cost eﬀective by 2006 compared to 1997, so that the 8 000 euro investment had become
unnecessary for many businesses.
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In addition to being 2006-speciﬁc, the ﬁrst point also explicitly only mentions the MCR. This simply
means that extrapolating the results to other kinds of entry barriers is questionable. Recall for instance
that van Stel et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the MCR is the only entry barrier they study that has an eﬀect on
entrepreneurship rates, suggesting at least that diﬀerent entry barriers can't be straightforwardly equated.
Finally, it is speciﬁc to limited companies, reﬂecting the fact that the estimates when all legal forms are
included appear to be less reliable. What this means is that one can't conclude whether the new limited
companies are adding to economic activity in the sense that no businesses would have been set up in
absence of the reform, or if the businesses would have been set up using some other legal form. Even if
the latter is the case, though, one might interpret the increase in limited incorporation as a success, as
limited companies seem to perform better on average.
The second point is the result of many factors. Starting already with the measurement of ﬁrms
dynamics, one has to necessarily make arbitrary decisions to present information in a quantiﬁed form.
Next, the universal nature of the MCR reforms makes it diﬃcult to control for the other factors that
might be inﬂuencing ﬁrm dynamics at any time. The heterogeneous diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy
adopted here provides in my view a relatively convincing approach to test the predictions arising from the
theoretical discussion, but has some drawbacks when it comes to estimating the actual magnitude of the
eﬀects. Firstly, the eﬀect on the control group remains unknown, and the rest of the eﬀects are downward
biased if it is not zero. Secondly, the measure of treatment intensity is rarely likely to be random, implying
that there is a reason why one unit of observation has a lower measure of intensity than another, and
that reason can be potentially confounded with other factors that might aﬀect the outcome of interest.
In this speciﬁc case the treatment intensity measure is correlated with ﬁrm smallness and the probability
of an industry being in the manufacturing section, both of which may directly reﬂect in the outcomes -
most notably the 2006 reform might have had other dimension that helped small business entry, and the
2008 crisis might have hit entry numbers in manufacturing worse than other industries. Finally, in this
case at least, as the treatment intensity measure is essentially a sample moment, it suﬀers deﬁnitionally
from decreasing accuracy as the size of the industry for which it is calculated decreases.
Even if one were to ignore the aforementioned uncertainty and take the large main estimates of this
thesis at face value, the lowering of entry barriers, at least the MCR, seems insuﬃcient to deal with the
observed falling entry rates and economic contribution of young ﬁrms that has served as motivation for
this and many other a study. This point is illustrated concisely by ﬁgure 4, where one observes that
despite the apparent eﬀects on the relative popularity of diﬀerent legal forms near the 1997 and 2006
reforms, the overall trend of entry rates is falling for all ﬁrms, reﬂecting the trends observed in many
other countries as well (Decker et. al. 2014; 2016, Calvino et al., 2015). These trends likely reﬂect
other systematic trends, and require more systematic solutions. Of course, it might also be that these
trends can not or do not need to be overturned - further research is needed, and indeed currently actively
pursued, on their sources and implications.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis has aimed to evaluate the eﬀect of the minimum capital requirement (MCR for short) on
Finnish ﬁrm dynamics, making use of two reforms that altered its level: an increase in 1997 and a
decrease in 2006. Taking into consideration the descriptive evidence and quantitative estimates as well
as the plausibility of the assumptions the latter builds on, I am conﬁdent in concluding that the number
of limited companies founded per year has been signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the level of the MCR, though
considerable uncertainty remains over the exact magnitude of the eﬀect.
The estimates presented here, if interpreted as absolute eﬀects, imply that roughly a 1 000 limited
companies would have been founded per year between 2007 and 2017 because of the reform, with the
average survival of entrants dropping a few percentage points and the average employment growth re-
maining the same. However, the absolute interpretation relies on the unrealistic assumption that the
third of industries with the lowest pre-reform share of entrants with minimum capital would be entirely
unaﬀected by the reform. It is far more likely that even these industries, which serve as the control group
in the identifying strategy utilized here, are also aﬀected to some extent, implying that the estimates for
the more aﬀected industries are biased towards zero and the true eﬀect is even larger. On the other hand,
this is only true if the identifying assumption of parallel trends between the treatment intensity groups
holds, which is plausible to some extent but far from certain. In particular, the group with the highest
treatment intensities may have a slightly faster growing trend than the others. Furthermore, the size of
the diﬀerences between the groups in the post-reform period grows increasingly wide after the 2008 crisis,
raising the question of whether this increase in diﬀerences is due to the reform or some other systematic
heterogeneity between the industries comprising the treatment intensity groups. Finally, any eﬀects are
only detectable for the 2006 reform, which is suspicious considering the size of the eﬀect, though data
limitations do make the 1997 estimates less reliable if the identifying assumption holds. Despite this,
however, descriptive evidence, especially on the entry rates of diﬀerent legal forms, presents patterns that
are unlikely to be coincidences with no eﬀects behind them.
Though the evidence in sum suggests that lowering entry barriers, at least in the form of the MCR,
has a net positive eﬀect on the total employment contribution of entrants, the overall eﬀect remains a
question. While I fail to ﬁnd evidence that incumbent ﬁrms in the more aﬀected industries would be
signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀected, and do in fact estimate signiﬁcant positive eﬀects directly on the total
employment of more aﬀected industries, it is evident that the identifying assumption fails in both of these
cases. Hence it appears that a diﬀerent strategy is required to conclusively determine whether the net
employment impact of the 2006 reform was positive. With that said, if one takes the estimated eﬀects
for entrants at face value, it seems unlikely that the eﬀects on incumbents could be negative enough to
diminish the net employment eﬀects to zero or below.
It should be noted, though, that, while beyond the scope of this paper, the lowering of entry barriers
may have other potential negative eﬀects, such as decreases in consumer and debtor protections. This is
especially relevant in the context of the recent 2019 removal of the MCR in Finland. According to YLE
news, a thousand new limited companies were founded in just 11 days following the removal, and the
tax administration has raised concerns over the potential of easing the founding of cover ﬁrms for illicit
operations (Muilu, 2019). Also, while the results in this thesis can provide some idea of the employment
eﬀects the removal might have in the long run, it should be noted that their external validity depends
on a lot of factors, not the least of which in this case is that, the removal of a barrier might have very
diﬀerent implications all things considered than simply lowering one.
Finally, a deeper question is the eﬀectiveness of lowering entry barriers in ﬁghting the perceived crisis
of falling entry rates and contribution of young ﬁrms. As pointed out, this trend is shared by a lot of
developed nations, and might hence have systematic causes beyond entry barriers. This possibility in the
Finnish case is supported for instance by the fact that the overall trend in the entry rate is decreasing
for all legal forms, even if the reforms in the MCR may have caused changes around the trend.
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A Robustness Checks
A.1 Treatment intensity groupings
Outcome Regressor
Coeﬃcient (Std. err.)
Only limited companies All legal forms
Three groups Four groups Five groups Three groups Four groups Five groups
Log number
of entrants
Post*G2 0.152***
(0.031)
-0.028
(0.036)
-0.189***
(0.041)
0.082**
(0.028)
-0.064*
(0.032)
-0.166***
(0.036)
Post*G3 0.317***
(0.031)
0.162***
(0.036)
0.114**
(0.040)
0.242***
(0.028)
0.099**
(0.032)
0.050
(0.036)
Post*G4 0.324***
(0.036)
0.091*
(0.040)
0.245***
(0.032)
0.031
(0.036)
Post*G5 0.283***
(0.041)
0.233***
(0.036)
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Post*G2 -0.008
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.013)
Post*G3 -0.029*
(0.013)
-0.012
(0.015)
-0.020
(0.017)
-0.031**
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.013)
Post*G4 -0.034*
(0.15)
-0.021
(0.017)
-0.032**
(0.011)
-0.026*
(0.013)
Post*G5 -0.045**
(0.017)
-0.036**
(0.013)
Log mean
employment
at age 3
Post*G2 0.048
(0.061)
0.081
(0.071)
-0.040
(0.080)
0.030
(0.056)
0.018
(0.065)
-0.091
(0.073)
Post*G3 0.029
(0.061)
0.082
(0.070)
0.035
(0.080)
-0.022
(0.956)
0.026
(0.065)
-0.017
(0.072)
Post*G4 0.043
(0.070)
0.020
(0.079)
-0.029
(0.065)
-0.041
(0.072)
Post*G5 0.048
(0.079)
-0.048
(0.072)
Log total cohort
employment
at age 3
Post*G2 0.159*
(0.073)
0.035
(0.085)
-0.196*
(0.096)
0.089
(0.067)
-0.064
(0.077)
-0.261**
(0.086)
Post*G3 0.290***
(0.073)
0.220**
(0.084)
0.138
(0.095)
0.168*
(0.066)
0.115
(0.076)
0.034
(0.085)
Post*G4 0.319***
(0.085)
0.098
(0.095)
0.173*
(0.076)
-0.027
(0.086)
Post*G5 0.296**
(0.095)
0.142
(0.085)
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Outcome Regressor
Coeﬃcient (Std. err.)
Only limited companies All legal forms
Three groups Four groups Five groups Three groups Four groups Five groups
Log number
of incumbents
Post*G2 -0.063***
(0.011)
-0.074***
(0.013)
-0.105***
(0.015)
Post*G3 -0.019
(0.011)
-0.051***
(0.013)
-0.074***
(0.015)
Post*G4 -0.036**
(0.013)
-0.038**
(0.015)
Post*G5 -0.060***
(0.015)
Log mean
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2 0.044*
(0.020)
0.038
(0.023)
0.025
(0.026)
Post*G3 0.108***
(0.020)
0.066**
(0.023)
0.035
(0.026)
Post*G4 0.101***
(0.023)
0.120***
(0.026)
Post*G5 0.101***
(0.026)
Log total
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2 -0.019
(0.022)
-0.036
(0.026)
-0.080**
(0.029)
Post*G3 0.089***
(0.022)
0.015
(0.026)
-0.039
(0.029)
Post*G4 0.063*
(0.026)
0.082**
(0.029)
Post*G5 0.041
(0.028)
Log total
employment
Post*G2 0.112***
(0.022)
-0.004
(0.025)
-0.106***
(0.028)
0.107***
(0.019)
0.013
(0.022)
-0.072**
(0.025)
Post*G3 0.306***
(0.022)
0.177***
(0.025)
0.090**
(0.028)
0.274***
(0.019)
0.153***
(0.022)
0.099***
(0.025)
Post*G4 0.283***
(0.025)
0.169***
(0.028)
0.267***
(0.023)
0.145***
(0.025)
Post*G5 0.293***
(0.028)
0.285***
(0.025)
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
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A.2 The 2008 crisis
Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (Std. err.) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3
Log number
of entrants
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.152***
(0.031)
0.141*
(0.061)
0.071
(0.036)
-0.069
(0.056)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.317***
(0.031)
0.176**
(0.061)
0.237***
(0.036)
0.039
(0.057)
Post*G2
(All)
0.082**
(0.028)
0.082
(0.052)
-0.024
(0.032)
-0.074
(0.049)
Post*G3
(All)
0.242***
(0.028)
0.135**
(0.052)
0.115***
(0.032)
0.060
(0.047)
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.058*
(0.027)
-0.006
(0.014)
-0.014
(0.023)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
-0.029*
(0.013)
-0.038
(0.027)
-0.025
(0.014)
-0.044
(0.024)
Post*G2
(All)
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.027
(0.020)
-0.008
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.018)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.031**
(0.010)
-0.020
(0.020)
-0.031**
(0.011)
-0.028
(0.018)
Log mean
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.048
(0.061)
0.026
(0.130)
-0.091
(0.066)
-0.137
(0.102)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.029
(0.061)
-0.128
(0.129)
-0.087
(0.066)
-0.178
(0.103)
Post*G2
(All)
0.030
(0.056)
-0.034
(0.119)
-0.054
(0.060)
-0.135
(0.092)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.022
(0.956)
-0.210
(0.118)
-0.099
(0.060)
-0.225*
(0.092)
Log total cohort
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.159*
(0.073)
0.070
(0.153)
-0.099
(0.080)
-0.304*
(0.123)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.290***
(0.073)
-0.034
(0.152)
0.081
(0.080)
-0.164
(0.124)
Post*G2
(All)
0.089
(0.067)
0.001
(0.138)
-0.119
(0.072)
-0.265*
(0.110)
Post*G3
(All)
0.168*
(0.066)
-0.112
(0.137)
-0.033
(0.071)
-0.203
(0.110)
Log number
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.063***
(0.011)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.075***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.019
(0.011)
-0.025
(0.014)
-0.027
(0.014)
-0.031*
(0.014)
Log mean
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
0.044*
(0.020)
0.026
(0.020)
0.018
(0.023)
0.084**
(0.033)
Post*G3
(All)
0.108***
(0.020)
0.059**
(0.020)
0.075**
(0.023)
0.136***
(0.033)
Log total
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.019
(0.022)
0.012
(0.019)
-0.057*
(0.023)
0.023
(0.036)
Post*G3
(All)
0.089***
(0.022)
0.034
(0.019)
0.048
(0.026)
0.105**
(0.037)
66
Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (Std. err.) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3
Log total
employment
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.112***
(0.022)
0.092*
(0.039)
-0.029
(0.025)
-0.027
(0.031)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.306***
(0.022)
0.173***
(0.038)
0.162***
(0.025)
0.060
(0.032)
Post*G2
(All)
0.107***
(0.019)
0.094**
(0.035)
-0.009
(0.022)
0.001
(0.026)
Post*G3
(All)
0.274***
(0.019)
0.168***
(0.034)
0.155***
(0.022)
0.093***
(0.027)
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
Descriptions of the speciﬁcations by number (0 is the original estimation):
1. The post-crisis years are excluded (the post-reform period consists only of the year 2007)
2. Manufacturing is excluded
3. Only retail and wholesale are included
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A.3 Diﬀerent study periods
Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (standard error) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3 4
a b c
Log number
of entrants
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.152***
(0.031)
0.133***
(0.038)
0.093*
(0.038)
0.233***
(0.044)
0.135**
(0.044)
0.142***
(0.034)
0.168***
(0.034)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.317***
(0.031)
0.285***
(0.038)
0.213***
(0.038)
0.438***
(0.044)
0.323***
(0.044)
0.284***
(0.034)
0.346***
(0.035)
Post*G2
(All)
0.082**
(0.028)
0.042
(0.033)
0.077*
(0.033)
0.161***
(0.040)
0.023
(0.039)
0.099**
(0.030)
0.114***
(0.031)
Post*G3
(All)
0.242***
(0.028)
0.154***
(0.033)
0.188***
(0.033)
0.367***
(0.039)
0.201***
(0.039)
0.246***
(0.030)
0.300***
(0.031)
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.021
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.023
(0.012)
0.012
(0.023)
-0.013
(0.014)
-0.007
(0.014)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
-0.029*
(0.013)
-0.041**
(0.016)
-0.017
(0.015)
-0.050**
(0.018)
-0.011
(0.027)
-0.031*
(0.014)
-0.027
(0.014)
Post*G2
(All)
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.012)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.007
(0.013)
-0.021
(0.020)
-0.002
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.011)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.031**
(0.010)
-0.041***
(0.012)
-0.020
(0.012)
-0.042**
(0.013)
-0.038
(0.020)
0.032**
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.011)
Log mean
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.048
(0.061)
-0.006
(0.075)
0.049
(0.075)
0.118
(0.083)
-0.117
(0.137)
0.042
(0.066)
0.031
(0.066)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.029
(0.061)
0.032
(0.074)
0.007
(0.075)
0.056
(0.833)
0.047
(0.137)
0.001
(0.065)
0.009
(0.066)
Post*G2
(All)
0.030
(0.056)
-0.030
(0.066)
0.024
(0.068)
0.090
(0.077)
-0.096
(0.125)
0.028
(0.060)
0.014
(0.061)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.022
(0.956)
-0.023
(0.068)
-0.035
(0.067)
0.008
(0.076)
-0.056
(0.125)
-0.035
(0.059)
-0.044
(0.060)
Log total cohort
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.159*
(0.073)
0.069
(0.089)
0.109
(0.089)
0.327**
(0.100)
-0.117
(0.162)
0.153
(0.078)
0.157*
(0.079)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.290***
(0.073)
0.234**
(0.089)
0.173
(0.089)
0.427***
(0.100)
0.388*
(0.163)
0.233**
(0.078)
0.312***
(0.079)
Post*G2
(All)
0.089
(0.067)
0.008
(0.080)
0.060
(0.080)
0.221*
(0.091)
-0.164
(0.145)
0.096
(0.070)
0.089
(0.072)
Post*G3
(All)
0.168*
(0.066)
0.074
(0.079)
0.077
(0.079)
0.311***
(0.090)
0.113
(0.145)
0.143*
(0.070)
0.197**
(0.071)
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Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (standard error) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3 4
a b c
Log number
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.063***
(0.011)
-0.034**
(0.013)
-0.064***
(0.013)
-0.091***
(0.014)
-0.044***
(0.012)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.019
(0.011)
-0.021
(0.013)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.019
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.011)
Log mean
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
0.044*
(0.020)
0.057**
(0.018)
0.073**
(0.023)
0.009
(0.026)
0.064***
(0.018)
Post*G3
(All)
0.108***
(0.020)
0.090***
(0.018)
0.124***
(0.023)
0.115***
(0.026)
0.101***
(0.018)
Log total
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.019
(0.022)
0.022
(0.020)
0.008
(0.026)
-0.082**
(0.029)
0.020
(0.020)
Post*G3
(All)
0.089***
(0.022)
0.069***
(0.020)
0.108***
(0.025)
0.096***
(0.028)
0.082***
(0.020)
Log total
employment
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.112***
(0.022)
0.073**
(0.022)
0.104***
(0.025)
0.121***
(0.031)
0.111***
(0.032)
0.110***
(0.023)
0.135***
(0.024)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.306***
(0.022)
0.256***
(0.022)
0.229***
(0.025)
0.319***
(0.031)
0.375***
(0.032)
0.258***
(0.023)
0.334***
(0.025)
Post*G2
(All)
0.107***
(0.019)
0.067***
(0.018)
0.107***
(0.023)
0.118***
(0.027)
0.095***
(0.028)
0.112***
(0.021)
0.130***
(0.022)
Post*G3
(All)
0.274***
(0.019)
0.222***
(0.017)
0.217***
(0.023)
0.291***
(0.027)
0.320***
(0.028)
0.240***
(0.021)
0.304***
(0.022)
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
Descriptions of the speciﬁcations by number (0 is the original estimation):
1. The years 1998-2001, for which share capital data isn't directly available, are dropped (note that
this doesn't aﬀect the incumbent outcomes)
2. The post-period is split to three to see if dynamic feedback loops such as competition diminish or
amplify the estimated eﬀects over time
(a) The post-period is 2007-2010
(b) The post-period is 2011-2013
(c) The post-period is 2014-2017 (note that for entrant survival, growth and total contribution
numbers this only covers the 2014 entrants)
3. The years 2013-2017, which are warned to not be comparable with the previous years by Statistics
Finland, are dropped
4. The years 2004-2005 are dropped. The cohorts that enter in those years are three years old only
after the reform. Hence their performance measured at that point might be aﬀected by the compe-
tition coming from the ﬁrst cohorts of post-reform entrants, unlike other pre-reform entrants (2003
entrants are at age three in 2006, so there may already be some post-reform entrants present when
their performance is measured. However, the reform goes into eﬀect at then end of the year, and
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it probably takes the ﬁrst entrants a while to get their business oﬀ the ground, so the increase in
competition should not be too signiﬁcant). Note that this mechanism does not concern incumbents.
It should also not aﬀect the number of entrants or total employment, as they are measured every
year, but the estimates are included for comparison.
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A.4 Other
Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (standard error) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3
a b
Log number
of entrants
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.152***
(0.031)
0.237***
(0.037)
-0.086**
(0.026)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.317***
(0.031)
0.328***
(0.038)
0.106***
(0.030)
Post*G2
(All)
0.082**
(0.028)
0.138***
(0.033)
-0.179***
(0.027)
Post*G3
(All)
0.242***
(0.028)
0.252***
(0.034)
-0.002
(0.027)
Share of cohort
alive at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.015)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
-0.029*
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.015)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.032*
(0.015)
Post*G2
(All)
-0.003
(0.010)
0.012
(0.012)
0.014
(0.013)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.011)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.031**
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.012)
0.004
(0.013)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.036**
(0.011)
Log mean
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.048
(0.061)
0.036
(0.057)
0.156*
(0.071)
0.084
(0.057)
0.105
(0.069)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.029
(0.061)
0.034
(0.057)
0.186**
(0.072)
0.086
(0.056)
0.076
(0.068)
Post*G2
(All)
0.030
(0.056)
-0.042
(0.052)
0.085
(0.066)
0.068
(0.052)
0.089
(0.062)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.022
(0.956)
-0.048
(0.052)
0.065
(0.066)
0.034
(0.051)
0.022
(0.062)
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Outcome
Regressor
(Included)
Coeﬃcient (standard error) from speciﬁcation number
0 1 2 3
a b
Log total cohort
employment
at age 3
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.159*
(0.073)
0.223**
(0.071)
0.138
(0.082)
0.239***
(0.069)
0.204*
(0.082)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.290***
(0.073)
0.298***
(0.071)
0.321***
(0.083)
0.392***
(0.068)
0.300***
(0.082)
Post*G2
(All)
0.089
(0.067)
0.069
(0.064)
-0.039
(0.075)
0.144*
(0.061)
0.141
(0.073)
Post*G3
(All)
0.168*
(0.066)
0.163*
(0.064)
0.090
(0.076)
0.261***
(0.061)
0.172*
(0.073)
Log number
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.063***
(0.011)
0.017
(0.018)
-0.104***
(0.013)
Post*G3
(All)
-0.019
(0.011)
0.026
(0.018)
-0.056***
(0.013)
Log mean
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
0.044*
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.020)
0.085**
(0.031)
Post*G3
(All)
0.108***
(0.020)
0.011
(0.020)
0.150***
(0.030)
Log total
employment
of incumbents
Post*G2
(All)
-0.019
(0.022)
-0.021
(0.034)
Post*G3
(All)
0.089***
(0.022)
0.093**
(0.034)
Log total
employment
Post*G2
(Lim.)
0.112***
(0.022)
0.080**
(0.026)
Post*G3
(Lim.)
0.306***
(0.022)
0.304***
(0.025)
Post*G2
(All)
0.107***
(0.019)
0.049
(0.025)
Post*G3
(All)
0.274***
(0.019)
0.279***
(0.025)
p < 0.05: *, <0.01: **, <0.001: ***
Descriptions of the speciﬁcations by number (0 is the original estimation):
1. Stricter deﬁnition of entry: a ﬁrm is only considered an entrant if the establishment-level deﬁnition
agrees and the disagreement with the legal entry date is zero or one. Note that this does not
aﬀect the total employment eﬀects. As for incumbents, all ﬁrms that appear in the data after the
reform but are not considered to be entrants by the stricter deﬁnition are counted into incumbents.
However, there are no observations for the employment of these ﬁrms before they appear. This
is not an issue for estimating the number (as one can simply add the late-appearing incumbents
in all previous years' totals) or average size of incumbents (disregarding worries of biasdness), but
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renders the direct estimation of incumbent contribution pointless, as the total industry employments
attributable to incumbents are inﬂated by these late-appearing incumbents.
2. There is no size threshold for an industry to be included in the estimation (the original estimation
required the included industries to have at least an average of 50 ﬁrms in the 2002-2005 and 2007-
2017 periods).
3. Survival, growth and total contribution of entrants are evaluated at diﬀerent ages
(a) At age 1
(b) At age 5
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B Sectors in Terms of the 2008 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
In ﬁgures 11 and 12, some of the industry categories (at the broadest level, denoted as letters A-U)
from the standard industrial classiﬁcation of 2008 used by Statistics Finland (Statistics Finland, 2008)
are grouped together under a sector title to make the ﬁgures less cluttered. The below table lists all of
the standard industrial classiﬁcation one-letter categories that are included under each title. Primary
production (A and B) and real estate (L) industries are excluded for the reasons mentioned in the data
description in section 2.1. In addition, public administration, defense and compulsory social security (O),
activities of households as employers (T) and activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies (U)
are excluded due to lack of observations. Firms with unknown industries (X) are also dropped out of
consideration.
Sector title used in the text One-letter industries included (Letter)
Manufacturing Manufacturing (C)
Wholesale & Retail Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G)
Construction Construction (F)
Utilities & Logistics Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D)
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities
(E)
Transportation and storage (H)
Services Human health and social work activities (Q)
Accommodation and food services (I)
Arts, entertainment and recreation (R)
Other service activities (S)
Information & Finance Information and communication (J)
Professional, scientiﬁc and technical activites (M)
Financial and insurance activites (K)
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C Parallel Trends and Group Composition for The 1997 Reform
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Sectoral Composition of the Treatment Intensity Groups for the 1997 Reform
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